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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to assess the impact of the European regional policy and the
European integration of Bulgaria on the political mobilisation, social-economic status and the
perception of two compact Muslim groups – Turks and Muslim Bulgarians (Pomaks), who are
the local majority in the Kardzhali and Smolyan districts of the South Central Region of Bulgaria
– about their place within united Europe.
Two basic factors influence the changes in the two districts, namely: the liberalisation of
minority rights and the restructuring of the local economy. These factors stimulate the political
and cultural mobilisation of the two Muslim minorities, change their economic status, and create
new foundations for their attitude towards the state and the Bulgarian national majority. The
penetration of the pre-accession funds in the region has been perceived in the same context: as
part of the new political situation, and yet, it is probably too early to assess their overall impact.
The results of the fieldwork show that the members of the local elites tend to idealize the
situation in the region. The “ideal” model they wish to achieve is characterised by: extensive
regional  co-operation,  support  for  decentralisation,  as  well  as  increasingly  institutionalised
regional-local alliances  across political  parties and  across national-ethnic communities;  local-
subnational government increasingly operating as a representative of the region rather than of the
ethnic  or  national  community;  minority-majority  interests  and  politics  defined  by  growing
convergence around economic and regional development objectives; declining politicisation of
cultural identity issues and their re-orientation away and dissociation from the state; widespread
identification with Europe, with the EU seen as an entity where various cultural identities can
flourish  and primarily as  a  source of  more  efficient  government,  economic  competence and
regional competitiveness.
1. Introduction
The focus of  the research is  on two compact  Muslim groups in  Bulgaria:  Turks and
Muslim Bulgarians (Pomaks), living in the Kardzhali and Smolyan districts of the South Central
Region of Bulgaria, near the Greek border. The objective is to assess the impact of the European
regional  policy  and  the  forthcoming  European  integration  of  Bulgaria  on  the  political
mobilisation, social-economic status and the perception of the two Muslim minorities of their
place within united Europe.
As European integration represents a part of large-scale historical changes in Eastern and
Southeastern  Europe over the  last  fifteen years, it  is  necessary to  outline  other  internal  and
external factors which influence the ongoing processes in the border regions with a predominant
Muslim (Turkish and Bulgarian) population. These factors are examined in sections two and
three of the report and include the following issues:
1. The legacy of the Bulgarian state policy towards Muslim minorities in the period after
the Liberation from Ottoman rule and to the end of socialism. This policy is characterised by two
basic features: firstly, the attempts to solve the minority problem by (forced) assimilation and/or
expulsion of the Muslim population, viewed as a threat for the territorial integrity of the state
(this issue is more extensively discussed in the State of the Art Report, see Lozanova et al. 2005),
and  secondly,  the  regional  economic  policy  and  especially  the  impact  of  nationalisation,
collectivisation of land and industrialisation on the social-economic development of the border
regions;
2. The impact of the liberalisation of the human and minority rights, and of the transfer
from totalitarian to a rule-of-law state after 1989, on the political mobilisation of minorities and
their participation in the political processes and the government;
3. The impact of the economic reforms and the transition from state to private property
(privatisation and restitution) on the social-economic status of the border minority regions;
4.  Acceleration  of  the  reforms  after  the  beginning of  the  negotiations  for  Bulgaria’s
accession to the EU and the significance of the regional planning and European pre-accession
funds for the neutralisation of the heavy social-economic effects of the economy reconstruction
and  for  the  preparation  of  administrative,  political,  and  economic  potential  in  the  minority
regions.
Section four of the report presents data on the current socio-economic situation in the
minority regions, their prospective development, and the cultural mobilisation of the two Muslim
groups. It is based on documents, statistical data, experimental analyses and published studies.
Despite  all  this  information,  it  is  still  insufficient  to  answer  the  question  about  the  role  of
European integration, and particularly of the pre-accession funds on the status and perceptions of
Muslim minorities. This is due at least to three factors: 1) Since the Bulgarian Constitution of
1991 does not recognise the existence of “minorities”, no official statistics exist on the economic
and social  status  of the  population with respect  to  ethnic  and religious characteristics.  Most
“minority” surveys constitute representative sociological excerpts for the country as a whole. 2)
Most development analyses and strategy plans refer to the South Central Region as a whole.
Among the six districts of the region, Kardzhali and Smolyan occupy the last places with regard
to  all  socio-economic  indicators,  i.e.  the  border  minority  regions  appear  to  be  the  most
underdeveloped and problematic ones. However, it has become possible to evaluate the concrete
parameters of their backwardness only after the publishing of basic data on the so-called “target
zones”, inclusive of the two minority districts. 3) Finally, the data on the amounts of the pre-
accession funds, allocated to Kardzhali and Smolyan districts, turned out to be collected not on a
district  or  regional  level  but  by the  Ministries  which  distribute  the  money and  monitor  the
implementation  of  the  projects.  Furthermore,  some  projects  (under  PHARE  and  ISPA)  are
sometimes implemented on the territory of more than one district or planning region, and the
Ministry of Agriculture and Forests reports do not always specify the location of the project-
winning company under the SAPARD program. 
All of the above enhances the importance of the fieldwork results, summarised in section
five of the report. They supplement the official data with information on how the minorities and
the majority perceive the effects of the ongoing processes on the economic situation of the border
regions, the practical aspects of the EU integration policy, the altered role of the local people and
their prospects for the future, when a part of united Europe.
2. Background of the case
Two main factors determined the development of Bulgaria during the 20th century and to
a great extent the idiosyncrasy of the Bulgarian democratic transition after 1989: the incomplete
nation- and state-building processes after liberation from Ottoman rule, and the post-communist
heritage characterised by the totalitarian state, coalescence of the Communist Party with all levels
of power, state-regulated economy and prevailing state property.
The belated, in comparison to Central and West European countries, and the unfinished
restoration, from the viewpoint of the national ideal, of the Bulgarian state within its “historical”
boundaries  incorporating  all  territories  inhabited  by Bulgarians,  left  a  grave imprint  on  the
domestic and foreign state policy in the late 19th and the first half of the 20th century. The fact that
the boundaries of the country were recognised not through bilateral negotiations but at a number
of  international  conferences  –  the  Congress  of  Berlin  (1878),  the  London  Conference  of
Ambassadors (1912), the Treaty of Bucharest (1913) and the Versailles system of 1919 – entailed
the feeling that “somebody outside” determined the development of Bulgaria. (Atanasova 2004:
359). The ceaseless endeavours of the Bulgarian governments to achieve the unrealised territorial
claims had determined the external political orientation of Bulgaria to those countries that tried
to re-design the European map over two World Wars.
The lack of stable democratic traditions should also be noted – the multi-party political
system  experienced  a  number  of  crises  (1924,  1934,  1935).  The  idea  of  the  nation-state,
according  to  which  there  should  be  a  correspondence  between  a  territory  and  a  people,
predetermined the attitude of the state towards the “living heritage” of the Ottoman Empire –
compact masses of Turkish populations in Southeastern and Northeastern Bulgaria and Pomaks
(Muslim Bulgarians) along the southern border of the country (the Rhodope Mountains).
The state policy towards the Turkish and Bulgarian-Muslim minorities during the first
half of the 20th century was marked by the following trends (Lozanova et al. 2005): 1) In general
their political and cultural-religious rights were observed, which were guaranteed by a number of
international treaties and by the fundamental law of the country – the Western-type Constitution
of the Principality (the Kingdom after 1908) of Bulgaria, adopted in 1879 (Art. 41, 43). However,
the minorities did not have political representation except through the national political parties.
2) The policy towards the two minority groups was differentiated: thus, the Turks were isolated;
some insignificant attempts were made to integrate them into Bulgarian society. On the other
hand, considerable efforts were directed to the integration of the Muslim Bulgarian population
but  they did  not  bring  substantial  results.  What  is  more,  open  assimilation  measures  were
occasionally  implemented  (1912–1913  and  1943).  At  the  same  time  successive  Bulgarian
governments sought solution of the “Turkish problem” mainly by encouraging the emigration of
Turks  and Pomaks  to  Turkey, sometimes  through bilateral  agreements.  Thus,  from the  very
beginning the displacements of population had a double effect: on the one hand, they were a
plausible pretext for reducing the numbers of the minorities, for the “cleansing” of the country
from the “foreign” population; on the other hand, they had a purely economic effect, as they led
to redistribution of property (basically land and real estate), due to the fact that the migrants lost
their property rights (Stanchev; Atanasova 2004: 361). It should be noted that this policy proved
to be quite successful (Vassileva 1992: 58–67).
There is no data of specific Bulgarian state economic policy in the regions with compact
minority populations  until  the middle of the 20th century.  Obviously the Bulgarian state was
reluctant to allocate sufficient funds for the development of the regions inhabited by Turks and
Pomaks, which was the cause of the increasing backwardness of these regions (Atanasova 2004:
363). The greater part the Rhodope Mountain inhabitants continued to rely on their traditional
sources  of  income:  the  seasonal,  nomadic  sheep-breeding,  and  after  the  1920s  on  tobacco-
growing.
Having become a part of Bulgaria in 1912, the Southern regions were included in the
existing administrative-territorial structure of the country1, and, in spite of the small amount of
available  data,  it  may be  concluded that  the  local  population preserved its  patriarchal  social
structure and had more confidence in the local (religious) leaders than in the central authorities
which  remained  unwanted.  As  mentioned  in  the  State  of  the  Art  Report,  the  Rodina
(‘Motherland’) association managed to convince some of the  Pomaks  to  accept  the ideas of
modernisation, but  in the end lost  its  influence as a result  of its straightforward assimilation
policy, especially during 1940s. In the same vein, although there were Turkish schools financed
by the Muslim community and partly by the state, their number was gradually reduced and the
quality of education was lower. The outcome of such policies was mass illiteracy among Turks
and Pomaks. Such policies had the effect of marginalising and alienating these ethnic groups
from the Bulgarian state  and contributed to the preservation of their feeling of belonging to
Turkey (Atanasova 2004: 363).
It is suggested that the Third Bulgarian Kingdom was by presumption established as a
national  state  of  unitary type, characterised by an  overwhelming dominance  of  the  majority
(Rokkan and Urwin 1982), since the ruling elites deliberately sought political centralisation and
ethnic unification. The compact masses of Turkish and Pomak populations were in dangerous
proximity to the border with their kin-state, Turkey. This was considered to be a constant source
of regional instability. Ethnic cleansing and assimilation were considered to be natural means for
the neutralisation of the “Turkish threat”. Any idea of broadening the rights of the Turks and
Muslim Bulgarians, institutionalised through international treaties, was considered a step towards
autonomy and, eventually, secession from the national territory. 
The  situation  of  the  Turks  and  Pomaks  changed  dramatically  after  1944.  The
Sovietisation of the country, the collectivisation of the land and the systematic atheistic policy
brought a fundamental change to their way of life. 
The policy towards minorities between 1944–1989 was incoherent and determined by the
evolution of the views on the nature of the Bulgarian socialist state. Immediately after the coup
d’etat  of  September  9,  1944,  when power was  seized  by the  Otechestven Front  (Fatherland
Front),  the  situation  of  the  minorities  improved  for  a  short  period  of  time.  An issue  under
consideration was a project for the establishment of a Balkan Federation, following the Soviet
model but with “people’s – democratic form of government”, which was supposed to resolve all
ethnic and territorial issues in Southeastern Europe. As early as 1945 the Turks received large
cultural autonomy: private Turkish schools were legalised and their status was made equal to that
of Bulgarian ones and periodical publications in the Turkish language reappeared. The Pomaks,
renamed in 1942, restored their names, and the requirement for the Turkish names to end in
“-ov” “-ev” was repealed (Stoyanov 1998: 96–97; 118).
In  the late  1940s  the “Turkish national  minority” was openly mentioned,  and it  was
included in  the  First  Republican  Constitution  of  1947,  which  guaranteed equal  rights  to  all
1 The first Administrative Division of the Principality of Bulgaria Act was adopted in May 1880 and remained in
force until 1901, when the second major administrative-territorial restructuring in the country was carried out, and
the new status existed for 33 years (until 1934). According to the Act, which was based on Art. 3 of the Tarnovo
Constitution, the territory of the country was separated into okrazi (provinces), okolii (districts) and self – governing
municipalities and local councils. The reform of 1934 replaced the existing 12 okrazi with 7 oblasti (regions) and the
territory of the Rhodope Mountains was governed by the center in Plovdiv. 
Bulgarian citizens regardless of their nationality, origin, denomination and property, while the
propaganda of racial, national or religious hatred was declared to be against the law (Art.71). The
initial draft of the 1947 Constitution even envisaged the right of all citizens to freely determine
their  nationality (in  Art.  71),  but  this  proposal  was omitted  in the  final  text  of the adopted
Constitution. (Stoyanov 1998: 98).
The Constitution of 1947 introduced a very important principle enshrined in the 1936
Soviet Constitution: unity of legislative, executive and judicial powers. Thus, the foundations of
the legalisation of the totalitarian state and “the leading role of the Party”, introduced by the next
constitution of  1971,  were laid  down.  The 1947 Constitution  proclaimed that  “schools  shall
belong to the state” and that “the church shall be separated from the state”, as a result of which
the Turkish schools fell under state control in 1948, and in 1949 the same happened not only to
the Orthodox Church, but also to the Mufti Office, the mosques and remaining Muslim religious
institutions. 
In compliance with the new Constitution, the government of the Fatherland Front took
further steps to put under total control not only the political, but also the economic life of the
country. In 1947 the National Assembly adopted the Nationalisation of Private Industrial and
Mining Enterprises Act, and in 1948 the Management and Exploitation of Forests Act made all
forests the property of the state. Impetus was given to intensive industrialisation, along with the
establishment of co-operative farms in the sphere of agriculture.
Meanwhile two important changes in international relations had a direct effect on the
situation of the minorities. The first was the fact that Bulgaria and Turkey found themselves on
the opposite sides of the Iron Curtain and since the two countries joined antagonist blocks –
NATO  (1950–1952)  and  the  Warsaw  Pact  (1955),  the  Turkish  and  the  Muslim  Bulgarian
minorities had increasingly been viewed as the “fifth column of the imperialism”. The second
change, which was equally important, was the fact that G. Dimitrov and J. B. Tito did not reach
agreement on the issue of a Balkan Federation and since the beginning of the1950s Bulgaria had
officially been described as a mono-national state. 
The tolerant policy towards ethnic and religious minorities  was gradually replaced by
harsher measures, especially after the April Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party (1956). The first step was the acceleration of collectivisation, since the initial stages of the
reform had led to the transfer of property to the state mainly in the lowland plains (62.5% until
1958). Statistical data show that in 1956, 42 % of Bulgarian Turks were still private owners and
30% of them were included in the co-operative farms. The difference in the situation for the
Pomaks was even greater – only 3.44% of them were included in the co-operative farms and
56.9%  were  private  owners.  The  figures  speak  unequivocally  about  the  dimension  of  the
collectivisation campaign: at the end of 1958 it had affected 90% of the farmers (Stoyanov 1998:
123, 125). During the 1950s more than 150,000 Turks and Pomaks left Bulgaria as a reaction to
the violent collectivisation of land.
Measures for modernisation and economic development of mountainous regions during
the 1960s and 1970s, allowed the Turks and Pomaks to stay apart from the migration processes
from the villages to towns, which took place in all parts of the country. Thus they managed to
preserve  their  ethnic,  cultural  and  religious specific  characteristics.  The  state  enhanced their
unwillingness to mix with the majority by creating employment opportunities in the so called
tzehove (workshops) – partial transfer of small industrial units from towns to villages (the so
called  ‘domestication  of  industry’,  Creed  1995;  Giordano  and  Kostova  1995:  157–164).  In
addition,  minority groups and regions were granted preferential  treatment  (higher wages and
lower prices). According to some incomplete data from the State Savings Bank, in 1989, regions
with a compact Muslim population held between 1.2 and 1.5 times more savings than the rest of
the country. However, given the circumstances (shortages, low consumption rates, etc.), these
figures cannot prove that the Muslim population had higher living standards (Stanchev).
The period of intensive industrialisation of the border regions coincided with the new rise
of state nationalism during the 1960s when new assimilation policy, with the objective to create a
homogeneous  socialist  nation,  began.  This  policy continued  until  the  end of  the  1980s  and
reached its climax with the “Revival Process”.
Thus, the Turkish and Muslim Bulgarian minorities met the democratic changes in 1989
after a severe ethnic confrontation and political and economic crisis. The relationship between
ethnic and religious differences with economic territorial structures could be taken as a typical
heritage of state socialism (Anagnostou 2005: 92). Despite being influenced by modernisation,
the two Muslim groups remained isolated and confined to the peripheral mountainous regions.
3. European integration and the domestic-regional context of change
The Democratic changes after November 10th, 1989, marked the beginning of the total
reconstruction of political and economic life in Bulgaria. The main changes included transition
from  a  totalitarian  state  to  a  democratic  multiparty  system,  from  a  state-regulated  planned
economy to a market economy, and the building of civil society based on the supremacy of law
and the observance of human and minorities’ rights. All these changes comprise the “internal”
factors, determining the political, economic and social development of the Muslim minorities’
regions.  Of  equal  importance  are  the  “external”  factors,  which  reflect  the  changes  in  the
international position of Bulgaria: the country’s participation in regional structures and especially
its accession to the EU.
3.1. Changes in the Political System and the Political Mobilisation of the Muslim Minorities
3.1.1. Minority Participation in the Central Legislative and Executive Powers 
Prior to 1989, the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) and its satellite party, the Bulgarian
Agrarian  People’s  Union  (BAPU),  were  the  only  legal  political  parties.  The  transition  to
democracy after 1989 began with the restoration of the multiparty system and reorganisation of
the  state  institutions,  based  on  two  principles:  the  separation  of  powers  and  a  republican
parliamentary  system.  Bulgaria  was  the  first  Eastern  European  country  to  adopt  a  new
constitution (July 1991), which laid the legal foundation for the changes.
As mentioned in the State of the Art Report, the beginning of the Bulgarian transition was
marked by strong ethnic tensions caused by the cruel assimilation campaign, which started in the
mid-1980s. It had a crucial effect on both the Turkish minority and Bulgarian society in general.
On the one hand, the Bulgarian Turks united and mobilised themselves along ethnic lines and in
1990 a political party –  the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) – was formed, was led
from the very beginning by Ahmed Dogan, and mainly represented their interests. On the other
hand, post-1989 anti-Communist political parties and civic organisations, most of which united
to form the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) coalition, became extremely sensitive to minority
issues.  During  the  first  years of  the  transition,  it  was  mainly the  ex-Communist  Bulgarian
Socialist  Party  (BSP,  former  BCP),  which  continued  to  use  “ethnic  scapegoating”  and
manipulated notions of “Bulgarian national interest” and the “Turkish threat”2. BSP questioned
the legitimacy of MRF (1990–1991), on the grounds that the Constitution (Art.11.4) and the
Political  Parties  Act  contained  provisions  prohibiting  the  formation  of  ethnic-based political
parties  and  organisations.  The  Constitutional  Court  ruled  in  1992  that  MRF  is  not
unconstitutional and can function as a normal party. That decision marked the beginning of the
successful Bulgarian ethnic model, based on peaceful ethnic coexistence3. Since then MRF has
always been represented in parliament, successfully passing the 4% threshold4. 
As can be seen from data on the results of the parliamentary elections, displayed in Table
1, MRF became the third strongest party in Bulgaria in the 1990s (both in terms of significance
and influence).
Table 1. Parliamentary elections results in Bulgaria after 1989
Elections BSP
Seats (%)
UDF
Seats (%)
NMSS
Seats (%)
MRF
Seats (%)
Others
Seats (%)
Voter turnout
%
1991 106 (33,14) 110 (34,36) - 21 (7,55) - 84,82
1994 125 (43,50) 69 (24,23) - 15 (5,44) 31 (11,24) 75,34
1997* 58 (22,07) 137 (52,26) - 19 (7,60) 26 (10,43) 64.11
2001** 48 (17,15) 51 (18,18) 120 (42.74) 21 (7,45) - 67.03
2005*** 82 (33,98) UDF 20 (8,44)
[DSB 17 (7,07)]
[BPU 13 (8,93)]
53 (21,83) 34 (14,07) Ataka (Attack)
21 (8,93)
55.76
In the beginning, MRF supported the democratic forces and the first UDF government led
by Philip Dimitrov (1991–1992), as the two parties shared common views on the liberalisation of
minority rights and a foreign policy oriented towards the West. Later MRF became dissatisfied
2 Nationalist parties appeared in the right sphere of the political spectrum as well but, in spite of their vociferous
rhetoric, none of them managed to enter the Parliament with the exception of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary
Organization (IMRO), which achieved that by forming a coalition with other parties.
3 A detailed analyses by V. Ganev on the conflicting arguments presented in the course of the constitutional trial that
ensued shows how the justices’ anxieties about the possible effects of politicised ethnicity were interwoven into
broader debates about the nature of democratic politics in a multiethnic society (Ganev 2004: 75–83). Nevertheless,
the “liberal”  constitutional interpretation articulated by the Court,  was not  entirely due to the will to  keep the
“principle of democratic pluralism”. As D. Anagnostou argues, the role of the Council of Europe in the legalisation
of MRF should not be underestimated. In January 1991 Bulgaria submitted the application for membership in the
CoE, but invoking the human rights principle, the CoE delegates had expressed their disapproval of the ban on ethnic
parties (Anagnostou 2005: 96).
4 There  is  a  4% threshold at  the national election for  a  party to  enter  the  Parliament. Seats in Parliament are
distributed proportionally among the parties that have passed this threshold. 
* All basic parties participated in the elections in coalitions: United Democratic Forces (Union of the Democratic
Forces,  Democratic  Party,  Bulgarian  Agrarian  People’s  Union  (BAPU),  Bulgarian  Social-Democratic  Party
(BSDP)); Bulgarian Left (BSP and Ecoglasnost); National Salvation Alliance (BAPU-Nikola Petkov, MRF, Green
Party, New Choice, and the monarchist Federation “Kingdom of Bulgaria”). 
** The  coalitions  were ADF (approximately the same composition);  Coalition for  Bulgaria  (alliance  of  the left
parties); MRF (in coalition with the Liberal Union and the Roma party Evroroma (Euroroma)). 
*** The coalitions on the last elections: UDF (UDF, Democratic Party,  Gergiovden (St. George’s Day),  BAPU,
National Association–BAPU, Movement for Equal and Social Model); Bulgarian People’s Union (BPU) (Union of
Free Democrats, which separated from the UDF, BAPU–People’s Union, IMRO); Coalition for Bulgaria; Coalition
Ataka (Attack) (the Attack Party and several other nationalist parties, which have not been represented parliamentary
until now).
with the government’s approach to agrarian reform, and finally withdrew its support and gave a
vote of no confidence to the government together with BSP. In December 1992 the President
Zhelyu Zhelev entrusted the task of nomination of Prime-Minister-designate to MRF. This led to
the election of the L. Berov government, which ruled for almost two years, but did not manage
do complete its mandate. The next parliamentary elections in 1994 were won by BSP, which
acquired an absolute majority in Parliament. When the single-party government of Zhan Videnov
was elected, the MRF and UDF MPs did not participate in the voting process.
By the spring of 1996, the ex-Communists’ reluctance to undertake far-reaching structural
reforms had contributed to a banking crisis, and after the collapse of the economy and the civic
unrest of 1997, the government resigned, preliminary parliamentary elections were called, and
the opposition United Democratic Forces (UDF) came to power in a coalition government with
BAPU. This produced a strong government backed by a wide majority in the Parliament and a
president  from  the  same  coalition  (Petar  Stoyanov,  elected  in  1996).  The  new  government
committed  itself  to  a  program of  stabilisation  of  finance,  privatisation,  and  Westernisation
through integration with Europe and the joining of NATO. A currency board was introduced in
July 1997, which stopped the hyperinflation spiral that had begun in the winter of 1996–1997,
and the banking system resumed work.
MRF entirely supported the foreign policy of the government, including its  unpopular
decision to allow NATO military airplanes into Bulgarian airspace during the Kosovo crisis. At
the same time MRF disagreed with UDF economic policy, having being disappointed by the
effect of the fast privatisation in the border minority regions, which was unsupported by adequate
social measures. In their turn, politicians on the right were disappointed by the MRF reaction and
accused Ahmed Dogan trying to isolate and confine the Turkish minority in order to preserve full
control over its votes, thus obstructing its integration into Bulgarian society. Gűner Tahir formed
an alternative National  Movement for Rights  and Freedoms (1996–1997),  which remained a
loyal  coalition  partner  of  the  UDF but  did  not  have  enough  influence  among  the  Turkish
population.
Two important elections dramatically changed the political status quo in the country in
2001. The parliamentary elections were a landslide for a coalition led by the former King Simeon
Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, or Simeon II, – the National Movement for Simeon the Second (NMSS).
The presidential elections in November brought to power Georgi Parvanov, the leader of the
BSP.  The results  displayed the  growing gap between popular  perceptions  of  the  democratic
system  and  the  elite’s  own  agenda:  only  three  months  after  its  formation  –  the  ex-king’s
Movement achieved victory in 28 of the country’s then 30 electoral districts. By declaring that he
would “establish and lead a public movement for new ethics in politics and for new economic
solutions,” Simeon successfully appealed to the anti–status quo and to the anti-establishment
sentiments of the voters. Following several rounds of negotiations, the NMSS and MRF signed
an agreement to govern the country together. As a result,  for the first  time since gaining its
independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1878, Bulgaria had two ethnic Turks as ministers.
In spite of the criticism from the right, the NMSS–MRF government continued the UDF
policy. It finalised privatisation in the banking sector and almost managed to privatise the big
state  monopolies  in  the  energy and  communication  sectors;  it  signed the  treaty with  which
Bulgaria became a NATO member (2004); it managed to complete successfully negotiations and
to sign the treaty for accession to the European Union (April 2005).  Furthermore, unlike the
former government, the NMSS–MRF government implemented aggressive social policy, which
decreased unemployment and the relative share of the gray economy. The government did not
manage, however, to keep the exaggerated pre-election commitments of Simeon Saxe-Coburg-
Gotha, for “immediate and not token increase of incomes” and for a reduction of the tax burden
on businesses. Relations between the coalition partners were not going smoothly either: MRF
wanted to acquire larger control over the pre-accession funds and to a great extent managed to
achieve  this  since  the  minister  of  agriculture  was  a  member  of  the  MRF;  the  serious
parliamentary crisis  during the winter of 2005 though was related to the privatisation of the
tobacco monopoly “Bulgartabak”,. This was caused by MRF, which publicly declared support for
the privatisation but insisted on real compensation for tobacco producers, most of whom are from
the border minority regions. 
The results of the last elections in June 2005 proved once again that the greatest challenge
to Bulgaria’s electoral system in recent years had been the general public’s declining confidence
in the ability of individuals to influence policy making through elections. The parties to the right
were divided and were not able to mobilise large support from the voters. The actions of the
former Prime-Minister, Ivan Kostov, contributed significantly to that outcome. In 2004 Kostov
did his  best  to  transfer the negative effects of his  rule to UDF and created a “new” party –
Democrats  for Strong Bulgaria (DSB) – which displayed some nationalist  attitudes.  Another
weakness of the rightwing politicians was their unwillingness to recognise NMSS as a natural
partner, since notwithstanding the fact that NMSS defined itself as a centre-right organisation, in
many aspects it was further to the right than UDF and its factions. Despite NMSS losing half its
supporters, it still won approximately as many seats in Parliament as the divided right parties put
together. Since 1990 BSP had been trying to move away from its Communist legacy, in order to
build a modern leftist organisation, and thus to legitimise itself in the international field. Thus it
had  given  up  the  nationalist  rhetoric,  and following the  1997 political  crisis,  the  party had
supported  Western  ideas.  In  2003,  BSP  was  accepted  for  full  membership  of  the  Socialist
International and  thus  received  serious  criticisms  from  its  supporters.  Eventually,  no  party
managed to win an absolute majority and the bipolar model was substituted by a coalition party
model, which emerged with the entry of Simeon II’s and his NMSS party’s entry into politics.
This development was facilitated by the fact that the left and right political parties’ positions on
key political issues have converged.
Following long and intense negotiation, in the summer of 2005, a three-party coalition
(BSP–NMSS–MRF) was formed with  the MRF’s  mandate.  The positions  in  the government
were  distributed  under  the  formula  8:  5:  3,  which  roughly  corresponds  to  the  number  of
parliamentary seats won by the coalition partners.
The direct participation of MRF in the government of the country after the last elections
is without precedent. The Movement won 34 seats in Parliament – the greatest number since
1989 – and in the Council of Ministers, headed by the leader of the socialists Sergei Stanishev,
MRF received two key ministries, which are directly related to the pre-accession funds: Dzhevdet
Chakarov, the Minister of Environment and Waters and Nihat Kabil, the Minister of Agriculture
and Forestry. Moreover, for the first time MRF has a Deputy Prime-Minister who is Minister of
Disaster Management Policy – the former Deputy–Chairperson of MRF Emel  Etem.  District
governors from MRF were appointed – once again in correspondence with the formula 8: 5: 3.
Another surprising result of the last elections is the success of Ataka (Attack) since it is
the first time since 1989 that a Bulgarian nationalist party has been represented in Parliament (see
Table  1).  Attack’s  electoral  programme deals  with  painful  issues  such as  low incomes  and
personal safety, the blame for which is placed on the political class in general and the presence of
the  “illegitimate  Turkish  party MRF” in  government  in  particular.  Attack  stands  behind the
demonstrations against the appointment of district governors (and deputy-governors) from the
MRF quota in “purely Bulgarian” districts, regardless of the fact that some of the nominated
persons  are ethnic  Bulgarians.  The  success  of  nationalistic  populism has  been  generated by
public  disappointment  in  the  reforms  of  the  last  14  years,  and  the  failure  of  successive
governments, both on the left and the right, to fulfill expectations for a rapid improvement of the
Bulgarian  economy;  and  also,  paradoxically,  by  the  refusal  of  the  parties  demonstrating
“moderate” nationalism (BSP and DSB, and even IMRO) to use ethnic confrontation in order to
overcome social tensions.5
On the other hand, MRF is subject to criticism on the part of Turkish nationalists: the
Turkish Democratic Party of Adem Kenan has been active since the autumn of 2005, and during
the visit of the Turkish President, A. Sezer, an individual named Menderes Kongűn started to
gather signatures under an appeal for recognition of the Turkish minority and against the “ethnic
party” of  Ahmed  Dogan.  MRF  distanced  itself  from  the  nationalist  actions  in  both  cases;
moreover, they were not supported by the Turkish population and were mainly of media effect,
while, as a party in the ruling coalition, MRF is well represented on all levels of government. 
Although MRF has never declared itself to be an ethnic party and Ahmed Dogan has
stated that new members are welcome regardless of their ethnicity or religion, MRF continues to
be mainly a party of Bulgarian Turks.  Since the beginning of  the transition the majority of
Muslim Bulgarians from the mixed Blagoevgrad District have voted in support of MRF. The
situation in the Smolyan District, however, is different:
Table 2: Parliamentary Elections in Kardzhali District and Smolyan District
 
Kardzhali District (seats in Parliament, %) Smolyan District (seats in Parliament, %)
1997 2001 2005 1997 2001 2005
BSP* -  (10.88) -  (7.59) -  (18.79) 1 (18.61) 1 (14.59) 2 (30,82)
UDF 1 (15.33) -  (10.81) -  (2.09) 3 (52.09) 1 (24.73) -
MRF 5 (59.94) 5 (58.07) 5 (67.32) -  (6.60) -  (6.19) 1 (15,52)
NMSS - -  (14.65) -  (5.16) - 2 (41.51) 1 (16,52)
Other - - - - - -
This situation confirms the trend described in the State of the Art Report: the Muslim
Bulgarians  look  for  representation  through  the  national  political  parties,  and  predominantly
through the parties to the right, thus following the general Bulgarian electoral model. At the same
time, in contrast with the other regions of the state where – especially at the beginning of the
transition – the  former Communist  Party used to  gain more votes  in  the  villages,  while  the
population of the big cities supported the democratic forces in general – the border minority
regions displayed the opposite characteristics: BSP had more supporters in the city of Smolyan,
while the rest of the municipalities of the district voted “in blue” (supported the “Blues”, or the
“Blue  party” –  the  UDF).  The  Table  displaying the  results  of  the  last  three  parliamentary
elections shows that since 2001, UDF voters have redirected their support towards NMSS and
MRF. This trend can be seen more clearly if the results of the local elections in the districts of
Kardzhali and Smolyan are compared.
5 The most recent example was the decision of the Central Electoral Commission (based on the Bulgarian Electoral
Law, Art. 6. line 2, and the d’Hont system, involving a mathematical model in which positions are shared between
different parties on the basis of proportionality) to give all five places in the Parliament from the Kardzhali electoral
district to MRF, notwithstanding the fact that the BSP’s candidate – a famous actor, who is at the moment Minister
of Culture – received more votes than each of the MRF’s candidates taken individually. In spite of the fact that in the
past the local BSP structures alluded to the “Turkish origin” of the MRF’s representatives, this time the protests were
only political in their nature. 
* For the names of the coalitions – participants in the elections see Table 1. 
3.1.2. Participation in the Local authorities
Table 3.  Results of  the 1999 and 2003 Local  Elections in Kardzhali District and
Smolyan District
Kardzhali District Smolyan District
1999 2003 1999 2003
Mayors Seats in LC Mayors Seats in LC Mayors Seats in LC Mayors Seats in LC
BSP - 15 -  12 - 25 1 20
UDF 1 28 -  10 5 58 2 27
MRF 4 94 7 141 - 11 1 21
NMSS - - -   6 - - 1 16
Others 2 14 -  14 5 70 5 85
As mentioned in the State of the Art Report, the local authorities in Bulgaria are based on
the territorial–administrative division of the country into municipalities and districts, which in
general follows the model of the First Bulgarian (Tarnovo) Constitution (1879). The changes in
the local government started in 1991 with the adoption of the new Constitution and of the Local
Self-government and Local Administration Act. With the Administration Act of 1998 and the
Civil  Servant  Act  of  1999  the  legislative  reform of  the  civil  service has  started.  The  basic
territorial  and administrative  unit  in  the  country is  the  municipality, while  the  division into
districts is only for coordination between the national government and the municipalities. The
municipalities are legal entities, have the right to own property, and have independent budgets.
They  have  authority  to  deal  on  a  normative  and  executive  level  with  all  issues  of  local
importance,  including  governance  of  municipal  property,  municipal  development  policies,
education,  healthcare,  culture,  provision  of  local  public  goods,  social  aid,  environmental
protection, and so on. According to the Constitution, the district governors are appointed by the
Council of Ministers. The bodies of municipal power are elected: the municipal council as a body
of self-government, and the mayor as a body of local executive power.
Before 1989 Bulgarians held the major positions in the local  administration of mixed
regions. As a result of the changes, the Turks and Muslim Bulgarians are now well represented
on all levels of local authorities and the relationships inside the municipal councils are rarely
politicised.  Contradictions  on  ethnic  grounds  are  even  rarer.  Disputes  are  oriented  mostly
towards practical issues, such as the need to restructure the local economy and to support private
business.  The  field  research  found  an  astonishing  unity  of  the  municipal  councillors  from
different political parties when voting on various initiatives, linked with the EU integration.
Although  the  budgets  of  the  municipalities  have  been  autonomous  since  1992,  the
heaviest problem for the municipal authorities is their funding. Municipal governments have two
sources  of  revenue:  central  budget  subsidies  and  local  and  property  taxes.  Due  to  the
constitutional requirement that all tax rates be approved by the National Assembly, local and
property tax rates are defined by each municipality and then adopted en block by parliament. The
municipalities have complete control over their own budgets, except when they receive money
from the central budget for targeted national programs. Traditionally, most municipalities rely on
central government subsidies for many of their needs and in a lot of cases the municipalities
governed by mayors belonging to the ruling party or coalition are in a more favourable position.
In 2000 the UDF government took the first cautious step giving local governments more
control over their own money, but the process of enhancing local governance is still impeded by
constitutional barriers to the financial autonomy of municipalities, despite the ongoing programs
that have been promoting fiscal decentralisation since 2003.
Since MRF participates directly in the central executive power for a second consecutive
mandate, the contradictions between the local authorities in Kardzhali District and the central
government  are  reduced  to  a  minimum6.  Nevertheless,  the  interviews  revealed  that  the
municipalities  need  additional  resources  in  order  to  co-finance  the  PHARE  and  SAPARD
programs in  which they participate actively.  Another problem, partially resolved by the new
development plans for the 2007–2013 period, was that local authorities expected the enforcement
of old socialist decrees that guaranteed border and mountainous regions a privileged regime (a set
of economic and social measures, such as higher salaries, etc.). 
3.2. Protection of Human Rights and Minority Rights in Bulgaria
Political  changes in  Bulgaria at  the end of  1989 and the subsequent  democratisation
enabled a full restoration of the rights of ethnic and religious communities. The fundamental law
of the state – the 1991 Constitution – emphasises the protection of fundamental human rights.
The Constitution also guarantees freedoms of speech, press, assembly, internal movement, and
emigration. In addition,  it  guarantees the right to privacy and bars racial, ethnic, gender, and
other forms of discrimination (Art. 6). It specifically protects economic freedom (Art. 19) and the
right to property (Art. 17). It is true that the 1991 Constitution does not use the term “minority”.
The main argument behind this is that official recognition of the term would create grounds for
claims that go beyond the sphere of human rights and involve certain complications in the sphere
of  interstate  relations.  Thus,  instead  of  collective  rights  of  the  minorities,  the  Constitution
protects  the  individual  rights  of  every  citizen.  Several  of  its  articles  guarantee  to  persons
belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic communities the right to preserve their culture, to
practice their religion and to speak their language (Art. 36, section 2; Art. 37).
Prior to the adoption of the 1991 Constitution, the state undertook concrete measures to
restore the rights of the Bulgarian Turks who had been subjected to legal persecution and forced
assimilation.  In January 1990,  the  government granted amnesty to  31 people who had been
imprisoned since 1984 for opposing the assimilation campaign. In March 1990, the Parliament
passed legislation that  allowed ethnic  Turks  and Muslim Bulgarians to  restore their  original
names, which had been forcibly changed, and in 1991 some 600,000 Turks, Pomaks, Roma and
Tatars used this right. Another statute granted amnesty to all persons sued in connection with the
assimilation campaign of  1984–1989:  in  November 1990 Article 273 of the  Criminal  Code,
which  criminalised  “spreading  untrue  allegations”  that  lead  to  a  “dissatisfaction  with  the
government” or “confusion within society,” and other similarly vaguely worded offences was
repealed. An amnesty was declared for those imprisoned under the law. The Parliament amended
Article 108, which addresses “anti-state agitation and propaganda,” so that the provision now
only prohibits the advocacy of violence, “fascism or another anti-democratic ideology”.
In December 1990, the rights of ethnic Turks to choose their own names, speak Turkish,
and practice Islam were fully restored. Approximately 60 Turks who had been imprisoned for
“treason and espionage” were freed. The assimilation campaign was officially recognised as an
illegal  act  and  violation  of  basic  human  rights.  However,  human  rights  organisations  have
6 This was not the case in the 1990s when MRF was in power in the Kardzhali district but did not participate in the
central government, which was run either by BSP or by UDF. For details, see Anagnostou 2005: 97–98.
complained that local prosecutors and magistrates sometimes fail to vigorously pursue crimes
committed against minorities.
Two decrees of the Council of Ministers (No. 29, 1990 and No. 170, 1991) and the so-
called Dogan Act (1992) constituted an indemnity package dealing with the housing, property
and employment of  Bulgarian  citizens  who had  emigrated to  Turkey in  1989  and  had later
returned. In conformity with these acts, no less than 3,000 houses were returned to their previous
owners (Nedeva 1993: 134–135). The next step for regulation of the economic and social rights
of the Turkish citizens was undertaken by the second UDF government. In the course of Ivan
Kostov’s visit in Turkey in November 1998 the two states signed an agreement about the welfare
payments by the Bulgarian government to the Bulgarian citizens permanently residing in Turkey.
The agreement affects some 40,000–50,000 Bulgarian Turks who migrated to Turkey after May
1989.
Again, during the rule of the second UDF government, President Petar Stoyanov signed
the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe in
October 1997, and on February 18, 1999 the Bulgarian National Assembly adopted a law for the
ratification of the Convention. In order to synchronise the Bulgarian legislation with that of the
European Union,  Bulgaria has  signed and ratified  all  internationally-adopted  conventions  on
human rights protection (including the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages).
The institutional base, which should guarantee the protection of these rights, has been set
up. In December 1997 the UDF government established the National Council  for Ethnic and
Demographic Issues within the Council of Ministers (recently renamed into National Council for
Cooperation on Ethnic and Demographic Issues). The Council is a state-public institution with
the task to coordinate the cooperation between government institutions and NGOs, aimed at the
implementation of the national policy on ethnic and demographic issues, and issues of migration.
The level of minority rights respect and protection in Bulgaria is monitored by a number of non-
governmental watchdogs concerned with human rights, and by international organisations.
Special  provisions exist regulating the right of the members of the minorities to learn
their mother language and to secure their religious rights. As early as the beginning of the 1990s,
MRF insisted that instruction in Turkish language should be introduced as part of the regular
curriculum in all Bulgarian schools. The demand caused a Bulgarian nationalist backlash. As a
result  the  Bulgarian  Parliament  adopted  the  Public  Education  Act  in  October  1991,  which
stipulated that Turkish could be taught only outside state schools. Several months later the newly
appointed minister of education revised this policy. In view of the fact that most of the schools in
Bulgaria are controlled by the municipalities and not by the state, the minister instituted Turkish
instruction in public schools on an extracurricular basis. After 1989 two colleges for the training
of Turkish teachers, as well  as four religious high schools and a High Islamic Institute were
established in Bulgaria. The teaching of the Turkish language and literature was restored at the
universities  of  Sofia  and  Shumen  (Nitzova  1997:  729–739;  Atanasova  2004:  394–397).  In
another positive development, the state-owned national television has launched a short Turkish-
language newscast.
In  December  2002,  the  National  Assembly  adopted  the  new  Religions  Act,  which
guarantees equality before the law regardless of religious beliefs (according to existing data, 84.9
% of the population is Orthodox Christian; another 13.1 % is Muslim; 0.8 %, Jewish; 0.7 %,
Catholic;  0.3  %,  Protestant;  and 0.2  %,  other).  The interference of  the state  in  the internal
organisation of the religious communities is declared inadmissible. Although it is a step forward
in comparison with the old Denominations Act of 1949, the new statute was strongly criticised
by religious groups and associations working in the field of human rights for its  preferential
treatment of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (of note is that, according to Art.13, Sec. 3 of the
1991 Constitution,  the Eastern Orthodox Christianity is the “traditional” religion in Bulgaria).
Furthermore, there are fears related to the wide powers of the Denominations Directorate within
the Council of Ministers, especially with regard to its exclusive prerogatives to deliver “expert
opinions” before the court on issues of registration, a procedure which seems selective, sluggish,
and non-transparent (IRF Report 2004).
3.3. Transition from centrally planned economy to market-based economy
3.3.1. Privatisation of industrial enterprises and its social effect
The economic impact of the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-
based economy on the Muslim minorities  in Kardzhali  District  and Smolyan District  can be
analysed within the larger framework of economic transformation in Bulgaria. The first step of
the changes was the transfer of property. Since 1989, privatisation has been carried out in three
main forms: restitution of land and urban property; cash sale of state and municipal assets; and
mass  privatisation  programs,  including privatisation  through vouchers  (Stanchev  2004).  The
restitution of land and urban property was regulated by four 1992 and one 1998 restitution acts,
the 1991 Ownership and Use of Agricultural Land Act (the “Land Restitution Act,”) as well as by
implementing  provisions.  The  1992  Transformation  and  Privatization  of  State-Owned  and
Municipal-Owned Enterprises Act (or the “Privatization Act,” as it is often referred to) regulates
the other methods of privatisation; by-laws contain provisions on the different procedures for
cash sales.
The actual privatisation process began slowly and the transition proved to be a lengthy
and costly process. There were many factors contributing to this. One of the important ones was
the slow overcoming of the post-Communist legacy in the economic structures, and as a result
the  gross  domestic  product  (GDP)  continued  to  decrease well  into  1997.  The second  UDF
government (1997–2001) introduced fiscal austerity and undertook the necessary regulative and
administrative measures to accelerate the reforms. The privatisation procedures were simplified
and accelerated. The government intended to privatise smaller mining, manufacturing, and food
processing companies under a less rigorous timetable, and the general trend was for the state to
withdraw from the economy. By October 1997, approximately 43 % of the assets of these smaller
companies had been exchanged for coupons held by citizens or managed for them by investment
funds. In all, approximately 32-35 % of the long-term assets of the state-owned enterprises had
been privatised by the end of 1997,  and until  the end of its  rule in 2001,  UDF managed to
privatise almost all small and medium sized enterprises, and a significant part of the large ones.
The fast privatisation had a crucial effect on the local economy in the regions inhabited
by  the  Muslim  minorities.  It  had  also  a  very  high  social  price.  Unemployment  increased
drastically, especially after insolvent firms that traditionally employed large numbers of people
were closed. That was especially the case for the mining and ore processing industry, which was
the basic source of income for the local population – Turks and Muslim Bulgarians.
The UDF strategy of fast privatisation and state withdrawal from economy also had a
strong political effect and led to an open conflict with MRF – the Movement criticised the UDF
government and insisted on a regionally-specific strategy, in which the central state should assist
economic development of peripheral municipalities (Anagnostou 2005: 100–103). On the other
hand,  the  liberalisation  of  the  economy and  macroeconomic  indicators  were  developing  in
compliance with the requirements of the EU integration and negotiation process.
3.3.2. Agrarian reform and its influence on regional development
Agrarian reform in Bulgaria consisted of two major processes carried out in parallel: land
reform and structural reform. As a result  of the land reform program, the socialist  bi-modal
agricultural structure — large state co-operatives (TKZS) and small household plots — had been
destroyed and replaced by new structures: individual private farms and farming companies, or
cooperatives,  established  by  owners  who  usually  did  not  cultivate  the  restituted  lands  but
preferred to grant them on a lease (Kopeva, Mihailov 1999). The restitution of property over
agricultural land was completed in 2001, while only 80 % of the forests have been restituted, as
the restitution process of forestry started much later.  
According to the 1992 census, the prevailing part of the landless population had ethnic
minority identity. However, the statistical data reveal that the Turkish population in the Kardzhali
District  region  has  restored  its  ownership  over  the  land and its  members  do  not  face  legal
difficulties in proving their property rights. Conversely, the Muslim Bulgarians come second,
after  the  Roma,  as  a  community  that  does  not  own  or  owns  an  insignificant  amount  of
agricultural  land (Kopeva, Mihaylov 1999). Probably the reason for that  situation is  the fact
described in the previous report – almost 70% of the territory of the Smolyan District is covered
by forests, while the agricultural land does not exceed 25%. Furthermore, although the agrarian
reform is  de-facto  finished,  its  formalisation  through the  issuing  of  proper  deeds  is  still  in
progress. The field research revealed that the aged Muslim Bulgarians in the region are not in a
hurry to show the notarial deeds for their restituted lands. This attitude is partially caused by their
unwillingness to face the bureaucratic administration, as well as by the fact that collectivisation
was  never  really felt  strongly in  the  highland  areas  –  the  agricultural  lands  are  small  and
separated by large distances, so even after the collectivisation all  individuals knew very well
what  were “their own lands”.  And yet, the unclear  situation with the  legal documents  is  an
obstacle for both the development of the agricultural land market and of the long-term leases to
farming companies.
Land  restitution  is  often  identified  by local  elites  as  a  precondition  for  solving  the
problems in agriculture. The practice has proved that the issue is not that simple. It has become
clear that the basic problems are caused by the quality of the soil and the climatic conditions,
which allow the cultivation of a limited number of plant sorts (mainly potatoes and tobacco). The
land owned by Turks and Muslim Bulgarians as a rule is eroded, deforested or insufficient to
provide  for  a  living.  Thus,  agriculture  proved  not  to  be  a  viable  solution  to  poverty  and
unemployment in  Southern Bulgaria.  What is  more,  tobacco production,  which provided the
basic means of living for more than half of the Muslim population in the Rhodope Mountains,
has suffered a severe crisis.
3.4. EU Integration and regional development
The most important external factor stimulating the democratic changes in Bulgaria and
directly influencing the development of the minority regions is the European integration and the
European regional policy in particular. 
At  the  beginning of the  transition,  the  establishment  of  diplomatic  relations  with  the
European Economic  Community and the  signing of the  Convention  on  Trade, Business and
Economic Relations in May, 1990, were important steps, through which Bulgaria managed to
overcome its political and economic isolation, caused by the assimilation campaign against the
Bulgarian Turks. The PHARE Program was opened for Bulgaria, and in the first half of the
1990s  several  governments  and  the  Bulgarian  Parliament  confirmed  the  country’s  desire  to
become  a  member  of  the  European  Community  (1990–1992),  and  the  European  Union
respectively (after 1993). The preliminary consultations in relation to the accession conditions
were started by Luben Berov’s Cabinet (1993). The next steps were made by the government of
Zhan Videnov (in March 1995 the Council of Ministers adopted Decree No 66 whereby a special
European  integration  mechanism,  involving  a  Government  Committee,  a  Coordinating
Commission, and a Secretariat on European Integration at the Council of Ministers, were created;
in December 1995 the Bulgarian Parliament adopted a decision for Bulgaria’s official application
for EU membership), but the financial collapse and the following political crisis postponed for
several years the possibility for Bulgaria to meet the Copenhagen criteria, adopted in June 1993.
Agenda 2000 of July 1997 mentioned the desire of Bulgaria to apply for membership, but
the opinion expressed was that the country was still not ready to begin negotiations for accession.
Meanwhile the Ivan Kostov government prepared a National Strategy on Bulgaria’s Accession to
EU (1998) and a National Program for the Adoption of the  Acquis Communautaire (NPAA),
which set  out  in  detail  the  necessary first  steps  and actions  for the country; the Framework
Convention for the Protection of  National  Minorities  was signed (1997) and ratified (1999).
During the rule of the second UDF government, European integration became a basic priority for
Bulgaria,  and  that  idea  was  accepted  with  consensus  by  all  political  forces  represented  in
Parliament. 
Immediately after the decision of the European Council to start negotiations for accession
with Bulgaria and five other countries (Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania and Malta), adopted
in Helsinki at the end of 1999, the Council of Ministers issued Decree No 3 upon which the
Chief  Negotiator  of  Bulgaria, the core team for  negotiations,  and work groups according to
negotiations’  chapters  were  appointed,  and  the  Parliament  established  a  Commission  on
European Integration (2000).
The next important steps towards accession were made in 2002: the regular report of the
European Commission recognised Bulgaria as a “functioning market economy” and supported its
desire to join the EU in 2007 (officially confirmed at the meetings in Prague and Copenhagen at
the end of 2002; at that time the so-called Roadmap for accession was adopted). The accession
treaty was signed in Luxembourg on April 26, 2005, and the so-called “safeguard clauses” were
incorporated, which guarantee the possibility for a review of “serious problems that may arise
before accession or in the three years after accession”. These clauses allow the EU to temporarily
exclude  Bulgaria from certain  policy areas from 2007 until  2010 if  the  country implements
reforms too slowly. Besides, the EU will continue to closely monitor Bulgaria’s progress in the
implementation of the reforms.
Within the five-year period (2000–2004), during which Bulgaria managed to implement
the  Copenhagen  criteria  to  a  level  sufficient  for  it  to  start  and  complete  the  accession
negotiations, the country received support through the PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD programs.
The increased funding from the EU, the requirement for co-financing from Bulgaria, and the
policy of continuity between the pre-accession and structural funds on the one hand and the
cohesion fund on the other, which Bulgaria will start to receive after 2007, necessitated concrete
institutional and legislative changes, which were mentioned in the previous report. 
3.4.1. Legislative amendments and regional development planning
In  2000  the  Council  of  Ministers  (Decree  No  145/27.07.2000)  defined  six  planning
regions (corresponding to the level NUTS II of the EU), as bases for planning, execution and
monitoring of regional interventions in the decentralised system, consistent with the practice of
EU  regional  policy.  Consequently,  the  changes  were  regulated  with  the  new  Regional
Development  Act  of  February 2004  (State  Gazette,  No  14/20.02.04),  which  substituted  the
former  statute  of  1999  (SG,  26/1999  г.). The  objectives  of  the  Act  are  “establishment  of
conditions for balanced and stable development of the regions in the Republic of Bulgaria” and
“…reduction of interregional and intraregional differences in the economic development of the
country”. The Act envisages two types of regional divisions:
Six planning regions (the fifth one is the South Central one, which includes the two
districts, subject of the research: Smolyan and Kardzhali), and
Target  zones  within  each  planning  region,  which  correspond  to  the  degree  of
development. These are: economic development areas, industrial decline areas, underdeveloped
border areas,  underdeveloped rural  areas, and underdeveloped mountainous areas.  The target
zones are defined as the territorial  foundation for the implementation  of regional policy and
include the territories of one or more neighbouring municipalities. It is important to notice that a
single municipality can be included in more than one target zone, if the municipality meets the
criteria for (Art. 7, Sec. 7).
The development of national and regional strategies for regional development started as
early as 1999–2000, and those strategies were based on an economic analysis of the planning
regions; definition of the priorities for development; as well as the means through which the
desired results must be achieved. National, regional and municipal development plans for the
2000–2006 period were created on  the  basis  of  the  strategies;  the plans  envisage  the  funds
necessary for their implementation, in correspondence with the state budget.
3.4.2. Implementation of the pre-accession funds in the South Central Region (SCR)
Of the three pre-accession instruments financed by the EU, the Bulgarian administration
has most experience with the PHARE program. The total budget of the program for Bulgaria is
2,400  million  Euro  and  contracts  for  ninety-three projects  have  been  signed;  12,9% of  the
projects and 10,2% (245,619 Euro) of the budget funds have been received by the six regions of
the SCR. The Smolyan district has 2.2% of the projects and has received 0.9% of the funds (for
the country) and the Kardzhali district – 1.1% of the projects and the funds (Ikonomichesko
2003).
There are no statistics on the implementation of the aid under the SAPARD program
because the projects are individual and are accounted for under measures for the country as a
whole. Bulgaria has been a party to the annual SAPARD programs from 2000 to 2003 inclusive,
and the  general  budget  under  these  four  annual  programs has  been 291.8  million Euro,  the
contracts signed have been for projects with the value of 234.8 million Euro, while the de-facto
utilised funds have amounted to 78.4 million Euro. The projects from the ISPA program, which
are realised, albeit only partially, on the territory of SCR, have the value of 15 921.5 thousand €;
in addition to that an ecologically oriented project is being implemented by the Smolyan and
Kardzhali municipalities (24 471 and 14 547 Euro respectively).
4. Changing opportunities and constraints for minorities
4.1. Social-economic characteristics of the Smolyan and Kardzhali Districts of SC Region
The territory of the two districts subject to the research (Smolyan and Kardzhali) covers
an area of 6 402 sq. km. (3 209 sq. km. and 3 192.9 sq. km. respectively). The Kardzhali District
(KD) includes seven municipalities and the Smolyan District (SD), ten. 
According to the National Statistical Institute (NSI) data for 2004, the population of the
two districts is 292 893 people, while according to the last census (2001) the population was
302 143, i.e. the demographic trends in the two districts follow the negative model of the country
as a whole. Over the period 1995–1999 the population of SCR decreased by 4.8%. This trend
continued over the next three years (1999–2001), and the greatest decrease was in KD – 18.8%
(9.5% for SD); this was caused by negative natural population growth and by emigration. Yet the
decrease in the population in SCR occurred at a slower rate than in the rest of the regions; the
birth rate for the 1999–2001 period increased from 8.9 to 9.1%.
The population density of the KD and SD is the lowest for the SCR – only 8.3% and 7%
of the population, respectively, live there and most of this is in the rural areas. The two districts
are the only ones in SCR where the urban population is below or near 50%: 32.7% for Kardzhali
and 50% for Smolyan. 
Table 4. Population of Kardzhali and Smolyan Districts in December, 2004, by Place
of Residence
Total                  Place of residence
In city/town In village
Bulgaria 7 761 049 5 431 846 2 329 203
SCR 1 933 271 1 269 908 663 363
Smolyan D 133 015 70 034 62 981
Kardzhali D 159 878 65 159 94 719
As mentioned in the previous report, the population is of mixed character: The Turks are
the majority in KD (in all the municipalities of the district) – 61.6 %; the second largest group are
the  Christian  Bulgarians  –  34%,  and  the  smallest  group  are  the  Muslim  Bulgarians  -
approximately  4.2%,  although  it  is  possible  that  an  insignificant  part  of  the  latter  group
(approximately 0.7%) define themselves as Turkish. The number of the individuals living in the
Smolyan District  who self-identify as Bulgarians is  87.6% but  only 29.6% declare that  they
belong to the Eastern Orthodox Church (21.4% in Kardzhali District), while 41.9% self-identify
themselves  as  Muslims  (69.6% in  KD),  and  the  percentage of  those  who  refuse  to  declare
religious affiliation is relatively high (11%). The Turks is Smolyan district are 4.4%, living in
three villages in the Devin-Dospat area. According to the third criterion used in the 2001 census
– mother tongue – Bulgarian is the native language for 34.7% of the population of the Kardzhali
district, while the Turkish speaking individuals are 61.53%; in the Smolyan district the numbers
are 92.2% and 4.1% respectively. The comparison of the data from the three indicators leads to
the conclusion that in SD the majority of residents are Muslim Bulgarians, a considerable number
of whom are with latent religious affinity, or prefer not to declare their affiliation; the second
largest group are Christian Bulgarians; and a small number of Turks also live in the district (in
the three villages). Therefore, the Bulgarian national majority is  “local minority” in both the
districts subject to the research.
SD and KD are located in the Rhodope Mountains. The infrastructure is relatively well
developed, but its overall condition in unsatisfactory. As a result of the natural environment, the
inherited social-economic structure, the past policies, and the dynamics of the development in the
transition period, well displayed disproportions can be observed in the economic development,
employment, incomes, and living standards of the populations of the two districts,  both with
regard to the indicators for the SCR, and for the country in general. This can be displayed by the
preliminary territorial range of the target zones (i.e. the areas that need aid), determined in April
2005  on  the  basis  of  the  data  from  the  NSI  and  in  correspondence  with  the  Regional
Development Act after its amendments and supplements (SG 31/12.04.2005).
Table 5. Target Zones in Smolyan and Kardzhali Districts
underdeveloped
rural areas
underdeveloped
border areas
underdeveloped
mountainous
areas
Economic
development
areas
industrial
decline area
SD Total 4 6 10 - 2
Banite х х
Borino х х х
Devin х х х
Dospat х х
Zlatograd х х
Madan х x
Nedelino х
Rudozem х х x
Smolyan х х
Chepelare х х
KD Total 2 2 6 - 2
Ardino х х
Dzhebel х
Kirkovo х х
Krumovgrad х х
Kardzhali x
Momchilgrad х x
Chernoochene х х
As it can be seen from the table 5, there is not a single municipality in either district,
which  can  be  included  in  the  most  prospective  group  of  “economic  development  areas”.
Furthermore,  most  of  the  municipalities  (with  the  exception  of  the  towns  of  Kardzhali  and
Dzhebel) fall under more than one target zone. Almost all municipalities (all ten in the SD and
six out of seven in the KD) are classified as “underdeveloped mountainous areas”, characterised
by an average altitude of 600 meters above the sea level, low degree of transport  technical and
social  infrastructure  development,  limited  possibilities  for  employment,  high  levels  of
unemployment, low incomes, and depopulation. The second significant group – “underdeveloped
border areas” – includes six municipalities from SD and two from KD, which are situated on the
border  with  Greece,  and  also  are  characterised  by  low  social-economic  development.  Six
municipalities (four in SD and two in KD) are “underdeveloped rural areas”, and four towns
(Madan  and  Rudozem  in  SD,  and  Kardzhali  and  Momchilgrad  in  KD)  are  classified  as
“industrial decline areas”, characterised by a high relative share of old industries (mining and
ore-processing),  worsened  economic  results,  and  high  percentage  of  unemployment
accompanying the structural reform.
The location of the KD and SD is exceptionally favourable for CBC with Greece, which
is highly relied upon to overcome the isolation of the two districts in the context of the European
integration of the country. The greatest problem at the moment is the absence of border check-
points on their territory, despite the existing intergovernmental agreements under PHARE–CBC. 
The basic indicators for the social-economic condition and for the adaptability of KD and
SD  to  the  changing  demands  of  the  economic  activity  are:  their  contribution  to  the  gross
domestic product (GDP) of  Bulgaria, the situation in the  labour market,  the structure of the
economy, the  degree of  penetration  of the private  sector  and the  development  of  small  and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and the amount of the direct foreign investments.
The SCR contribution to the GDP of the country has been relatively constant: during
the period 1999–2003 the region was second in significance for the Bulgarian economy after the
South West Region, having a relative share of 20% (21% for 1999, 20.89% for 2000 and 20.64%
for 2001), and real growth of 9.39% for 2001. The analyses made for the preparation of the
National Plan for Development envisage that this trend will continue until 2006. On the other
hand, the relative share of the KD and SD is lower than that of the other four districts in the SCR
(under 20% for 2001) and has dropped by 1.88% for KD, and has increased by 2.2% for the SD.
Labour Market. Less than 700, 000 individuals are engaged in the different economic
spheres of the SCR (690, 400 for 2000). Until 2000, the trend for the country in general and for
the SCR in particular was a decrease of employment and increase in unemployment. Over the
period 1999–2000 the registered unemployment in SCR increased from 16,7 % to 17,9 %, while
in both of the districts, subject to the research, the climax came in 2001–2002. This negative
trend was to a great extent related to the restructuring of the economy. The public sector offered
less employment possibilities because of the ongoing privatisation, while the private sector was
incapable of accommodating all  individuals,  dismissed from the public sector. Still,  in 2000,
52.7% of the employees in SCR worked for the private sector.
In order to describe the economic characteristics of the SCR, it is important to display the
employment structure in accordance with the sectors of the economy. The share of the employed
in agriculture, forestry, and industry has decreased. The greatest number of individuals work in
the services sector. There is some increase in employment in industry in the KD and SD, but as a
result of the lack of data on the movement of the employed in the agricultural sector, we can only
conclude  that  the  percentage in  this  sector  is  rather  high;  as  can be  seen  in  the  table,  this
percentage is near and above fifty. It is important to highlight the lower level of unemployment in
the KD in comparison with that for the country. This situation is caused mainly by the high
number of tailoring firms in the district (approximately fifty to sixty). On the other hand, SD
occupies one of the last places in the national table of employment, the lowest unemployment
rates being registered in the centre – Smolyan – and in the small town of Chepelare.
Table 6. Labour Market and Unemployment
Relative share of the employees in the
industry compared to the total number
of employed individuals (%)
Employees in
the
agriculture 
Unemployment (%)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2003 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Bulgaria 39.98 39.76 39.50 38.35 17.2 16.97 17.88 17.32 16.27 13.51
KD:
Ardino 38.39 40.63 38.38 41.60 41.8 29.28 30.52 27.95 32.02 24.56
Dzhebel 22.09 45.93 50.19 56.28 48.9 17.80 19.96 18.50 23.63 21.70
Kirkovo 34.97 37.47 39.70 39.48 62.6 15.94 19.98 18.70 24.03 18.77
Krumovgrad 37.38 39.63 47.58 47.62 54.2 16.08 16.48 16.20 22.06 18.78
Kardzhali 48.79 49.47 50.94 48.67 18.8 11.77 11.55 10.88 12.47 10.54
Momchilgrad 48.95 57.27 55.82 58.80 41.10 14.11 11.93 14.79 19.29 14.45
Chernoochene 26.69 30.04 33.69 42.15 53.2 10.31 11.73 10.41 11.28 8.84
SD:
Banite 17.79 18.29 20.05 18.98 73.2 23.24 23.30 23.02 27.19 25.33
Borino 22.13 33.44 42.46 41.94 56.8 44.01 51.47 47.74 41.99 32.79
Devin 35.22 39.09 36.33 34.71 39.1 30.89 34.34 34.69 33.01 28.99
Dospat 58.42 63.88 57.70 54.63 56.5 30.62 32.14 29.91 25.27 17.81
Zlatograd 48.69 50.49 58.38 60.82 28.1 24.62 28.01 21.87 22.12 15.29
Madan 55.54 55.29 59.64 56.65 41.7 35.10 26.82 28.14 29.98 26.27
Nedelino 40.55 43.18 41.22 42.82 55.9 38.74 38.04 31.87 27.94 24.96
Rudozem 58.21 59.85 58.87 60.11 28.5 28.07 23.98 29.15 33.37 25.04
Smolyan 34.09 38.99 34.31 34.96 24.5 17.62 18.18 18.11 19.48 16.10
Chepelare 26.46 32.13 29.43 33.28 24.8 15.72 19.51 20.44 21.11 18.29
Agriculture, a traditional occupation in the past, is in decline in the SD as a result of the
abrupt transition to private property and fragmentation of land. In 2000 the sector held the last
place among the six basic sectors of the district’s economy in terms of sales; trade, industry,
construction, transport, and tourism were ahead of it.  In KD the agriculture has preserved its
monoculture nature – the region is a well-known producer of oriental tobacco brands. Tobacco
growing is the basic activity and source of income in five out of the six municipalities in the
district.  For example,  in  Krumovgrad municipality, more than 50% of  the active population
works in that sphere.
Industry  in SCR produced 34.05 % of the gross added value (GAV) in the region in
2001 and 34.2% in 2003. The distribution of the production of the industrial enterprises in the
SCR is an important indicator for the industrial profile of the region, which is characterised with
an, albeit insignificant, increase of the relative share of the food industry at the expense of other
industrial branches. In 2001 the basic products of the region were foods, beverages, and tobacco
–  23.06%.  Metallurgy  and  the  production  of  metal  goods  had  a  relatively  stable  rate  of
development  and market  demand (internal  and foreign) –  their  share of  the  production  was
11.5%. The production of  machines  (smelting and metal  processing) and resource extracting
industries displayed a similar level of performance, losing their role as factors determining the
economic structure; their production had reduced to 11.3%. These trends and indicators did not
change significantly during the next couple of years. 
The number of SMEs in the SCR has been constantly increasing in recent years. This is a
typical trend for the country in general and a natural result of the restructuring of the economy.
There were 53 809 registered companies at the end of 2000, which employed 30% of the total
number of employees.  At the same time approximately 93.5 % of the SMEs had one to ten
employees. The KD and SD have the lowest concentration of SMEs – 7% and 8% respectively of
all companies in the SCR are located on their territories and the number of the employed in the
private sector is the lowest for the country.  
The situation regarding direct foreign investments is not good either. In 2001 the SCR
took fifth place among the six planning regions in accordance with the distribution of direct
foreign investments; it had 5% or 132, 462.7 million USD. The distribution within the region is
extremely uneven. The KD is one place from the bottom for the country as a whole. Over the
period 1992–2001 it managed to attract investments of 2.4 million USD. In 2001 the share of the
KD in total SCR investments was only 3%, while the share of the SD was even smaller – 1%;
according to the foreign investments  indicator, SD holds  22nd place in the country. Over the
period  1992–2001  it  managed  to  attract  investments  of  12.9  million  USD,  which  was  an
insignificantly small amount.
The analysts’ assessment of the social-economic situation in the SCR is that the region
has  potential  for  development  but  there  are  considerable  disproportions  between  the  most
developed districts – Plovdiv and Stara Zagora – and the most underdeveloped ones – Kardzhali
and Smolyan, the latter being included among the areas that are in need of aid. As a result of this
the  National  Plan  for  Economic  Development  (2000–2006)  proposes  the  region  receive
investment support for economic and social approximation, financed under the PHARE program.
The SCR was the first region for which a Regional Innovation Strategy was developed (2001–
2004).  On  the  basis  of  the  regional  development  plan,  a  SWOT-analysis  was  made  of  the
advantages and disadvantages, of the possibilities for and the limitations of the social-economic
development of KD and SD, and came to the following generalised results:
Advantages: preserved nature; presence of resources and a potential for development of
tourism, logging and wood-processing, textile,  power production etc; existing facilities in the
mining industry; presence of qualified labour force; well developed power supply network. 
Disadvantages: high unemployment; poor infrastructure and road network, which is not
in  compliance with the  European safety and comfort  standards of travelling;  increase of  the
incomes received in kind; low purchasing capacity of the population; absence of own investment
capital for the local entrepreneurs; ineffective institutional structure to support the development
of the private initiative; difficult access to bank credits.
Possibilities:  the  opening  of  new  border  check-points  will  increase  the  economic
attractiveness of the region; the building of a road network in the municipalities will contribute to
the improvement of the transport communications and the normal functioning of the economy;
the introduction of technologies to prevent the production of industrial  waste in  logging and
wood-processing industries; reform in the structure of the production of goods by directing it to
products based on the local agriculture and resource extracting industry, in order a complete
production  and  technological  line  to  be  created;  establishment  of  exchange and  commodity
markets  for  agricultural  products;  stimulation  of  the  producers  of  organic  food;  search  of
prospects for establishment of joint ventures with foreign participation; expansion of the offering
of  tourist  services through encouragement  of  rural,  hunting,  fishing,  speleological,  mountain
trekking, and other alternative types of tourism.
Risks:  the region is  distant and peripheral;  the investment in regional projects are not
financially guaranteed; the dependency on the central budget financing increases; the liquidation
of  entire  sectors  as  extraction  of  uranium,  electronics,  mining;  chain  reaction  emigration  of
people and enterprises; insufficiently developed infrastructure; absence of markets for part of the
producers; agriculture cannot be the only alternative on the territory of KD and SD.
The analysis of the regional economy displays that it is in a recreational and defensive
strategic  position,  which  means  that  it  cannot  rely  on  stabilisation  without  centralised
investments  and  implementation  of  centralised  programs;  the  gaps  between  advantages  and
disadvantages  are too  great,  which means  that  the  closing of  the gaps requires a  significant
amount of time; the level of risk is high, which implies a serious hazard for the implementation
of the strategic programs for development of the region. 
According to the SWOT analysis, the two fundamental  approaches for recreation and
stabilisation of the local economy are: 
Resource approach, based on the utilisation of the resources existing in the region. This
approach can be developed in two directions: organisation of production of goods with a higher
degree of processing of the raw materials, and commercialisation of the resources, which have
not been used until now. This approach is for the local authorities and institutions.
Investment approach, relying on commitments on the part of the central authorities to the
region, while the local authorities and institutions are to propose, direct, and lobby for centralised
investments and to create conditions for their realisation.
4.2.  Cultural  mobilisation of  Turks  and Muslim Bulgarians  in  Kardzhali  and  Smolyan
Districts
The  constitutional  and  legislative  regulation  of  the  language and  religious  rights  of
minorities, including in the sphere of education, is referred to above. Studying of the Turkish
language (by the Turks) and religious education (for the Bulgarian- Muslims and the Turks) are
evaluated by the representatives  of  the minorities  as a  means  of preservation of their  group
cultural identity and coherence, as well as being a way for them to acquire the right of equal
opportunities  by reforming previously discriminatory educational  policies  (Atanassova 2004:
393). However, this is only the first point at issue. The other is related to granting an equal access
to education for minorities as the majority, which would thus put both groups on an equal level
regarding future career prospects. These two aspects of the situation of minority education are
analysed below, mainly on the basis of sociological surveys, as no sufficient statistical data is
available.
4.2.1. Studying of Turkish Language
The supplements  to  Art.  8,  Sec.  2 of the National Education Act (SG No  36/1998),
legalised  the  practice  introduced  by Decree  No  183  of  September  1994,  of  the  Council  of
Ministers: “Pupils, whose mother language is not Bulgarian shall have the right,  apart from the
mandatory  study  of  Bulgarian  language,  to  study  their  mother  language  in  the  municipal
schools…”; and the term “mother language” is defined broadly in another legal document (Rules
on the Application of the National Education Act, Art. 5, Sec.4) as “…the language in which the
child communicates in the family before the child starts to go to school.”
The studying of Turkish language is an optional subject from first to eighth grade (four
hours per week, outside the regular curriculum). Teaching programs, textbooks, and dictionaries
are  prepared  and  approved by the  Ministry of  Education  and Science,  and  the  children  are
provided with textbooks free of charge, i.e. they are paid for by the municipality. The opinion of
parents, though, is that the textbooks are out of date (they have not been changed since 1993) and
insufficient in number. Another problem is the requirement for a minimum number of pupils
willing to study Turkish in order for a group to be created – the general requirement for the
country is for thirteen children, while in small settlements the number of the pupils may be lower
(down to seven) if the corresponding municipal council has adopted decision to that effect. All
this impedes the process of teaching and creates dissatisfaction among the parents. 
In 1999 the Turkish language became a part of the curriculum after 8th grade (72 school
hours in ninth and tenth grade, and 108 school hours in eleventh and twelfth); it was included
among the so-called mandatory-selection subjects (MSS – i.e. a list of subjects from which the
student is obliged to pick a certain number) and once again restrictions on the number of students
in a group were introduced (no less than eleven and no more than 20). The Turkish language
became a MSS from the first grade in the 2002–2003 school year, the other two in the list were
English language and choreography i.e. today the parents have to choose if their children will
study their  mother language or one of the other  two subjects.  According to a  representative
sociological survey, this is one of the reasons for the difference among the number of children
who wish to study their mother language (30%) and the actual number of children who in fact do
so (only 19.5% of the Turkish pupils are studying Turkish in school); the parents prefer their
children to study the English language, which gives them better prospects for the future.
According to the statistical data, in the 2001–2002 school year, the Turkish language was
studied by 34,860 pupils in 520 schools, and taught by 703 teachers, most of whom (over 80%)
were licensed to teach that subject.
Apart form the municipal schools, where Turkish is studied as a “mother language”, it is
also taught as foreign language in the Muslim denominational schools in Shumen, Russe, and
Momchilgrad,  and in specialist  private schools: “Balkan School” of the “Bulgarian Colleges’
Foundation and the Private Language School “Druzhba” of the Bulgarian-Turkish Democratic
Foundation. 
4.2.2. Religious education of the Muslim Minorities 
The religious education of the Muslim community children is an important stage of their
socialisation,  giving  them  the  necessary  knowledge  and  skills  to  perform  their  religious
obligations. Immediately after 1989, the local mesdjit (small mosques) and mosques resumed the
traditional “teaching of the Koran” (including recitations of the holy book in Arabic, explanation
of the rules of the prayer, and of the fundamental principles of the religion) for the children in the
primary grades of school, and even for those too young to go to school. The classes were taught
by local  hodja (teachers) outside the school curriculum. Ultimately, an exam had to be taken
before the local ulema (the body of scholars of Muslim religion and law) and the children were
gradually becoming part of the local community of believers. There are no data on the number of
children who have finished this type of training, but especially in the first years this approach was
wide-spread. The textbooks and other necessary equipment were provided by the Office of the
Chief Mufti.
In  the 1997–1998 school  year, after more than  fifty years of  suspension,  the  general
schools  reintroduced religion as  an optional  subject,  and the “Religion-Islam” discipline was
introduced as optional subjects for grades one to four in the following year (as part of the basic
subject). In order for the subject to be included in the curriculum at least 12 pupils were required.
Over the period 1999–2001, 3215 children in 78 settlements underwent experimental teaching.
The  teaching  programs  were  created  by  the  Ministry  of  Education  and  Science  (MES)  in
cooperation  with  the  Office  of  the  Chief  Mufti,  the  latter  providing  the  textbooks.  The
“Secondary Education” Department of MES has had an expert on religion since 2001 (Doklad
2003).
In  2002,  the  amendments  in  Educational  Degree,  Basic  Educational  Minimum,  and
Curriculum Act, made the subject “Religion” a MSS in the cultural-educational sphere of “Social
Sciences, Civil Education and Religion” for grades one to twelve.
Until 2002 this form of education was financed by the central budget and the Office of
the Chief Mufti. After the reform of 2002, the task was transferred to the municipalities, and the
lack of funds there meant that the discipline could not be studied even if there were individuals
willing to attend such classes.
As  early  as  1991,  the  National  Assembly  adopted  a  decision,  which  created  three
denominational Islamic schools in Shumen, Russe and Momchilgrad (with a branch in the village
of Rogozche, Dzhebel Region, Eastern Rhodopes). The teaching there is from ninth to twelfth
grade  under  a  curriculum  approved  by  the  MES  and  the  Office  of  the  Chief  Mufti.  The
denominational  schools  teach  general  disciplines  (as  in  the  regular  high  schools)  and  eight
special subjects in the sphere of religion (history of religion, history of Islam, science of Koran,
Arab language, etc.). The students do not have to pay for tuition, their textbooks and equipment
are provided free of charge and are approved by MES and the Office of Chief Mufti. At the end
of their studies the students receive a diploma of secondary education from MES and a diploma
for imam hatip from the Office of the Chief Mufti, which allows them to work as imams in the
mosques. The students are predominantly boys (138 in Momchilgrad in 2004), while the branch
in Rogozche teaches girls (87 in 2004).
The  applicants  for  the  denominational  schools  outweigh  the  places  available  and  a
selection procedure is  being implemented,  giving priority to  orphans and children from poor
families from the regions of Gotse Delchev, Blagoevgrad, Devin, Dospat, Pazardzhik, Madan
and Rudozem; these children a provided with board and lodging.
The students and the teachers are both Turks and Muslim Bulgarians. The teachers are
mainly alumni  of the secondary denominational  schools and of the  High Islamic Institute  in
Sofia; many of them have additional qualifications acquired in Turkey, or come from Turkey.
The educational process is controlled by the regional inspectors on education of MES and by the
Office of the Chief Mufti; no malpractices have been found until now.
The Islamic denominational schools are financed by the Office of the Chief Mufti, the
Dyanet Vakfi (Directorate on Denominations of the Republic of Turkey), and by donations. 
In addition, the so-called “illegal Islamic schools” exist; usually under the name “Koran
Teaching” (two of them are on the territory of SD – in Dospat and Ustina). Such schools can be
licensed only by the Bulgarian Denomination Directorate and a class must last for at least 2–3
months. Most of these classes have been licensed only by the Office of the Chief Mufti (Sarnitsa)
or remained unlicensed and covered up as “boarding houses”. The courses in the illegal schools
are nine months long and those who have taken them do not receive any certification for an
acquired qualification or degree. The unclear status of that type of teaching creates suspicions
that these classes are dedicated to “radical  Islam”, that  Jihad  and “religious intolerance” are
propagated.  According to  a  journalist  investigation (“Capital”  Weekly of  August  2004),  and
statements  of high-ranking Muslim clerics (who are in opposition to the Chief Mufti),  these
illegal schools are funded by the “al-Waqf al- Islami” Foundation, which was banned in Saudi
Arabia  in  2001,  and  which  prior  to  that,  in  the  beginning  of  the  1990s,  had  financed  the
construction of mosques in Northeastern Bulgaria. These allegations have not been proven until
now, but it is sure that the ideological controversy over the issue as to whether these schools
teach Hanifi Islam, traditional for Bulgarian Muslims, or the fundamentalist Wahabi form, is
actually a cover for political and economic interests.
The Muslims have one more form of religious teaching, the so-called “Summer Classes in
Islam”, which started in 1998 and are organised by the Office of the Chief Mufti during the
summer holiday. The wide-spread interest in these classes can be displayed by the fact that in
2001 in the region of Smolyan they were attended by 1,000 children from 45 settlements. 
4.2.3. Educational Level of the Muslim Minorities 
According to the  national  statistical  data from 2001,  the  educational  structure of  the
Bulgarian population is clearly differentiated. Table 7 represents basic data on the population of
KD and SD in respect to the level of education. As these data do not incorporate ethnic and
religious belonging, and in many of the settlement the population is of mixed character, the data
from the national representative survey on the educational situation among minorities could also
be referred to (Project 2003).
Table 7. Population in accordance with level of education at March 31, 2001.
University Bachelor High
school
Secondary
School
Primary
school
Illiterate Child Not
displayed
Bulgaria 716 863 333 671 2 826
821
2 049
443
1 372
722
132 888 471 686 24 807
KD 
Ardino 255 312 3 178 4 875 3 599 589 794 49
Dzhebel 167 154 1 757 3 278 2 264 456 549 36
Kirkovo 346 503 4 544 8 948 7 040 1 167 1 621 51
Krumovgrad 401 580 3 868 6 750 5 597 1 201 1 404 126
Kardzhali 4 237 3 285 20 861 20 139 13 158 3 206 4 552 392
Momchilgrad 376 457 3 981 5 971 4 250 994 1 099 57
Chernoochene 105 184 1 772 4 077 2 938 786 668 39
SD 
Banite 149 223 1 867 1 945 1 969 285 307 20
Borino 100 93 1 200 1 227 1 130 106 249 4
Devin 486 581 4 472 4 857 3 391 384 798 41
Dospat 299 255 3 317 3 198 2 345 139 713 10
Zlatograd 458 467 4 863 3 864 3 170 369 826 25
Madan 315 298 4 295 4 431 3 350 309 763 51
Nedelino 220 224 2 855 2 459 2 120 214 615 8
Rudozem 266 324 3 610 3 101 2 618 187 744 25
Smolyan 3 645 2 596 16 760 12 534 8 448 640 2 404 203
Chepelare 484 416 3 185 2 892 1 693 79 454 29
According to the sociological surveys, more than 97% of the well-educated individuals in
the country are Bulgarians, while the share of university educated Turks among all the university
educated population is  approximately 1.2 % (the Muslim Bulgarians are not  included in the
results). This means that only 2.7 % of the Turkish population is has a university education. In
particular, it is disturbing that the share of those who do not even have primary education is
5.6%, and most of them are absolutely illiterate (3, 45 %). The situation looks even worse, given
the fact that school education is free of charge and accessible to all citizens.
The problems start  even below the school  level – approximately 16% of the Turkish
children have not been to kindergarten (6.8% for the Bulgarians). Approximately 16%–18% of
the parents  explain that  situation with their  inability to  pay the required taxes and fees. The
absence of pre-school teaching has a permanent effect on the teaching and the integration of the
children in the schools. Approximately 46% of Turks do not know the Bulgarian alphabet when
they start school (neither do 17.2% of Bulgarians) and 59.3% of the Turkish children require
additional classes in the Bulgarian language. As a result, the average grades of the children (both
belonging to the minorities and the majority) who have not been in kindergarten are significantly
lower.
Another  serious  problem is  the  fact  that,  unlike the Bulgarians,  most  of  the children
belonging to minorities tend to leave school before reaching the age of 16. According to the NSI
data, in the 2003–2004 school year 2.93% of the pupils in KD and 0.86% in the SD had stopped
to  go  to  school,  the  main  explanations  being:  departure  abroad (approximately 55% of  the
respondents  in  KD and 25  % in  SD) or  family considerations  (17% and 48% respectively)
(Novatorski 2005). The NGOs have a positive experience in overcoming this situation: IMIR, for
example, has, for six years, been implementing the stipend program “Rodopi” (Rhodopes) for
Turkish and Muslim Bulgarian children living on the border and remote regions in the Eastern
and Western Rhodopes. The program has proved that the parents of the children who perform
excellently in school need insignificant encouragement to send their talented kids to the nearby
town/city to continue their education in elite high schools; and almost 90% of these children
move on into university education.
To sum up, the overall situation is disturbing, as the lower education level places the
Turks and the Muslim Bulgarians  at  a disadvantage in the labour market,  and is  one of the
reasons  for  the  high  levels  of  unemployment  among  them.  Most  of  them  have  secondary
education,  which  is  not  enough to  make  them  competitive.  Further,  the  low incomes  from
unqualified labour create a barrier to securing a better education for the future generations.
5. Local actor responses and perceptions
Three members of IMIR’s team (Dr. Evgenia Troeva-Grigorova, Dr. Iva Kyurkchieva and
Dr. Bojidar Alexiev) have conducted the field research in the South Central region of Bulgaria.
They have been working in two districts for a total of 15 days – 10 days in Kardzhali district and
5 days in Smolyan district. They have conducted 42 interviews with 44 persons – Turks, Pomaks
and Bulgarians, of which 17 were females and 27 were males. The team has selected respondents
in accordance with the goals of the project, formulated by the WP2 and has also considered the
table, indicating the approximate correlation between representatives of political, economic, civil
and  business  circles,  linked  to  the  issues  of  regional  development  and  the  role  of  the  EU
integration  policies  in  the  minority  populated  border  regions.  Yet  the  correlation  between
representatives  of  various  social-professional  categories had  to  be  somewhat  changed in  the
course  of  the  work  to  provide  a  more  accurate  presentation  of  the  Bulgarian  situation.
Specifically, we had to increase the number of interviews with persons, working in the municipal
and district administration, involved in directly “servicing” EU funded projects. Most of these
employees have undergone special training. A serious difficulty was to find more politicians who
do not hold office and informal leaders of the minority communities. Most important reason for
this is that the MRF is a part of the governing coalition for the second time in a row, and almost
its whole political resource is directly involved in the government.
5.1. Economic development of the region and EU integration
The opinion of the respondents about the socio-economic development of the Kardzhali
and  Smolyan  districts  almost  fully  corresponds  to  the  expert  evaluations.  Unemployment,
underdeveloped infrastructure, weak interest of investors – both domestic and foreign, isolation
and emigration were named as the main problems. Some respondents also noted the limited
possibilities  of  enterprises  for introduction of  new technologies,  low-skilled work force,  and
closure of small manufacturing, which used to provide employment in the mountain areas. In
agricultural regions, the main problems are small size and segmentation of arable land, which
makes the use of agricultural machines difficult. Lack of initiative and disbelief that people can
improve their situation on their own, have also been mentioned as important obstacles.
The economic situation began to improve in 2000–2001, and especially after 2003, when
the  government  of  NMSS–MRF  took  several  concrete  measures  (respondents  named  the
following as the most important: in 7 out of 10 municipalities of Smolyan district, enterprises
were  granted  significant  tax  cuts,  which  increased  the  investments  from other  parts  of  the
country; subsidies from the fund of the program for regional development “Rhodopes”).
Although the revival of the regional economic development roughly corresponds to the
arrival of pre-accession funds to the region, not all interviewees are convinced that there is a
direct link between the two. The main reason is that few believe that the project as realised so far
– mainly from the PHARE program – will have long-term effects (“No long-term jobs are being
created”)  and the interviewees from the private  sector stress that  they are not encouraged to
develop their businesses or to make a profit. The fact is that the effect of pre-accession funds is
negligible outside the local administration, NGOs and few businesses, which are involved in the
work on EU funded projects.
However, most respondents believe that it is logical that EU funds are directed above all
towards the building of civil society structures, training of personnel and providing employment
to the most vulnerable social categories – the so-called “from people to people” PHARE projects.
The general conclusion is that local people will not feel any significant improvements in their
daily lives until the real economic revival is first stimulated and then achieved.
5.2.  The  effect  of  pre-accession  EU  programs  on  local  administration  and  the  non-
governmental sector
The regular arrival of pre-accession funds to KD and SD since 1999–2000 has altered the
roles of municipal (elected) and district (appointed by the central government) authorities and
their administrations, and has led to personnel and structural changes.
The general feeling was that employees in the municipal and district administration were
on average very young. Most of them had a technical or humanitarian educational background,
and in addition also a Masters degree (or at least a specialisation) in economics. Some of the
administrators have also undergone special training, financed by PHARE, on how to prepare and
write projects. The special attention given to the education and training of people employed in
the administration is a consequence of the fact that one of the main reasons for the small number
of projects funded from pre-accession programs was the lack of trained personnel (both in terms
of quantity and quality). This partially explains  why until  recently the better-educated ethnic
Bulgarian  minority  in  Kardzhali  and  Smolyan  districts  was  more  active  regarding  these
programs. Lately, however, a visible effort has been made to increase the education level  of
ethnic  minorities  –  a  task  listed  as  one  of  the  priorities  of  MRF on  the  last  parliamentary
elections. Another reason for training of local administrators is that they have to be prepared for
the implementation of structural funds and to be familiar with the rules for strategic planning.
These rules have been used in practice as preparation of the municipal plans for development in
the 2007–2013 period.
One  of  the  visible  results  of  the  structural  changes  in  municipalities  and  in  district
administration was the establishment of special departments for Euro-integration. Another is the
hiring of experts to regularly follow information on forthcoming projects, and then forward the
relevant  information  to  all  interested  persons  and  institutions.  The  information  from  the
government is spread also during the so-called “informative days” for employees of the district
administration and through brochures. According to the opinion of respondents, however, the
latter is expensive, slow and ineffective.
A very positive development we noticed is that in all activities, linked with providing
information on EU projects, a very good cooperation exists between NGOs and municipalities.
All  respondents have highlighted the  importance of informal contacts  and personal initiative
during  work.  Useful  working  links  have  been  established  also  with  colleagues  in  relevant
ministries. A serious weakness, though, was also mentioned – a bad practice, typical at least for
the time being before the introduction of the new Law on State Servants - every time a minister
was changed, even during one government term, the teams trained for work on the EU funds left,
and precious time was lost before new cadres familiarised themselves with the work.
Some  respondents  also  noted  the  astonishing  unity  of  municipal  councillors  from
different political  parties when voting on various initiatives  linked with EU integration. Yet,
others hinted that some councillors and MPs from the region are not concerned with the general
interest,  but  only that  of  “their  people”  (most  likely,  the  respondent  had  in  mind  MPs  and
councillors from MRF, who mainly supported their party members).
Municipalities also prepare, win and realise their own projects – mostly linked with the
efforts to overcome the ecological problems and problems of unemployment in former mining
and  steel-producing  areas  (“Construction  of  the  regional  centre  for  waste-management  in
Kardzhali”; “Partnership for the cleaner river Arda”; in Rudozem a shoe-making factory was
opened in a reconstructed building and with modern equipment). The result of these projects was
positive, since it improved the environment and provided dozens of jobs, which is very important
in a region with high unemployment.
5.3. Influence of EU pre-accession programs on SME and agricultural producers
The high degree of  political  mobilisation  of  the Turks  in  Kardzhali  District  was not
accompanied  by  the  same  degree  of  economic  mobilisation.  Notwithstanding  the  MRF’s
concerns and efforts related to the district – or maybe as a result of them – the dominant part of
the local population continues to rely on state subsidies, tobacco growing, and small tailoring
enterprises founded by Greek and Turkish businessmen.
The young individuals from Kardzhali district – both from the majority and from the
minority – prefer to work abroad in Western Europe and mainly invest their money in real estate;
only a small number of the local inhabitants start their own business. The general impression is
that the Bulgarians are more active economically – both in terms of founding small and middle
size enterprises, and in participation in European projects, regardless of the logical assumption
that the Turks have greater possibilities through MRF. Most probably this passive behaviour is a
result of the lack of enough trained specialists. (Therefore, the creation of a well-educated local
administrative elite from the Turkish minority should be noted as one of the positive changes.)
Approximately the same situation can be observed in Smolyan District. On the one hand,
one can see an inert and scepticism in the future elder generation, while on the other, the young
specialists, who return after they have finished their education or have worked abroad, with the
intention to realise their achievements in their native country. In general, the economic activity in
this district is higher both among the Christian and Muslim Bulgarians.
Local elites rely strongly on European funds, and yet, Smolyan District  also seems to
display slow utilisation of the opportunities  granted under SAPARD for improvement of the
quality of  agricultural products  – most  projects  here are related to  the development  of  rural
tourism. As a result, the local MRF activists have undertaken the task to inform the producers
about the conditions of the program (because the agricultural minister is representative of MRF
in a second successive Government) and to convince them that in order to survive the producers
must at least take the following initial steps: to obtain the documents proving ownership over
land, to organise themselves in associations in order to group the separated pieces of land and the
small animal-breeding farms. This practical approach will probably increase the MRF’s influence
in the areas inhabited by Muslim Bulgarians; the extent of the increase will become clear in the
forthcoming local  elections.  It  must  be  emphasised  that  the  economic  interests  in  Smolyan
District enhance political mobilisation.
Two groups of private entrepreneurs have so far been applying for funding through pre-
accession programs. One group consists of people, who have lost their jobs, but who are not
merely looking to survive, but are trying to find their own “niche” of activity. In the second
group fall persons who already have their own small and medium-size business, and hope either
to  expand  it  or  to  improve the  quality of  their  production  in  order  to  obtain  the  necessary
certificates, without which they will not be able to operate after 2007. All those, who had their
projects approved, are satisfied with what has been achieved and intend to participate also in
other appropriate EU programs. They, however, just  like the people whose projects were not
approved,  or  who  did  not  meet  the  application  criteria,  commented  on  difficulties  they
encountered  in  the  procedure.  The  most  problematic  requirement  is  that  those  agricultural
producers, wishing to apply to the program, need to have more arable land, more livestock and
larger turnover than is realistically possible in the Rhodopes. Local agricultural producers also
experience difficulties in coming up with the initial capital, since the program funding covers
50% of the investment only after the completion of the project and evaluation of the result. This
is why many people view SAPARD with scepticism. Finding a loan with low interest rates and a
longer paying off period is another problem.
Despite the difficulties, respondents note that participation in the EU programs raises the
self-confidence and prestige of the people. They become more open to new ideas and begin to
think  more positively. Several  respondents  commented that  training for  participation in  pre-
accession programs is “a very good opportunity to change our mentality,” that “people become
more European” and that “Europe becomes much closer”. The internal barriers are crossed, and
people are not afraid any more that they will not be able to deal with the new situation after
accession to the EU. The effects of the pre-accession assistance are evaluated positively, but it
seems that there are much higher expectations for the structural funds.
The opportunities for CBC with Greece, created by the pre-accession funds, are utilised
mainly through joint projects on a municipal level in the spheres of ecology, telecommunications,
or exchange of information about the activities of Bulgarian and Greek companies. The plans for
opening of new border check-points have not resulted in positive developments until now. It is
interesting that the contacts between the representatives of Muslim elites on both sides of the
border do no appear to create feelings of ethnic or religious solidarity and they obviously prefer
to stay “on their own side”.
5.4. Expected effect of Bulgaria’s accession to the EU in 2007 on the economic development
of the region
The general opinion is that Bulgaria’s accession to the EU will  have a predominantly
positive effect on the economic development of the country and the region in particular. This is
due above all to two factors: the introduction of “European norms” and the structural funds. On
the other hand, there are serious concerns that accession will also lead to mass bankruptcy of
small  enterprises,  which do not  meet  the EU criteria for  quality of production and working
conditions. Even the expected rise of the standard of living is seen as an unfavourable factor for
small-sized  proprietors.  The  examples  set  forward are small  textile  manufactures,  which are
currently attractive for investors from neighbouring Turkey and Greece mainly because of cheap
labour.
Another possible difficulty is the need to quickly restructure the agricultural production.
Respondents  note  that  the  importance  of  traditional  tobacco  cultivation  will  progressively
decrease  and  farmers  will  have  to  shift  to  alternative  agriculture,  and  especially  to  eco-
production.
5.5.  Relations between the Bulgarian  majority and the Turkish  and Muslim Bulgarian
minorities.
When asked to comment on relations between the Bulgarian majority and Turkish and
Bulgarian  Muslim  minorities  in  connection  with  the  problems  of  regional  development  or
participation in  EU projects,  all  respondents  categorically described it  as  “partnership.” The
members of working teams are selected strictly on the basis of their professional qualities, not
because of their ethnic or religious belongings. Business representatives also view qualification
as the most important criterion when hiring their employees. In NGOs dealing with the issues of
inter-ethnic relations and prevention of ethnic conflicts, representatives of main ethnic groups
work together. (However, it seems that  Bulgarians are more active in NGOs.)
The  basic  reason  is  the  solidarity  created  by the  common  interest  in  improving  the
economic status of the district. Another factor frequently mentioned is the long-standing tradition
of peaceful cohabitation in the two districts with mixed population. On the other hand, some –
not only from the majority, but also from the Turkish minority – imply that many Bulgarians
leave Kardzhali and resettle in the central regions of the country, and the one to blame is the
“party  MRF”,  which  has  occupied  all  power  positions.  The  Bulgarian  Muslims  express
dissatisfaction  with  the  “construction  of  churches” in  the  area of  Nedelino,  where  Muslims
mainly live and where the well-known priest  of Pomak origin father Saraev “converts” local
Muslims to Christianity. Some Bulgarians expressed certain worries about the increased interest
of Turkish businesspersons in buying property in Bulgaria.
Certain contradictions and concealed tensions do exist,  but people deliberately do not
comment  on them. Many note that  more time will  have to  pass before ethnic  and religious
differences will entirely cease to matter.
Minority representatives  believe  that  now,  their  rights  are  protected  and respected in
Bulgaria. Despite that, they note that “there is still room for improving” and that “after our EU
accession,  such  problems  will  finally disappear.”  The  representatives  of  the  local  minorities
definitely develop the feeling that there are supranational (European) power structures, which are
not indifferent to the economic welfare of the region and to some extent could guarantee that
their rights would be respected. In the words of one of the respondents, the EU accession will
offer  additional  guarantees for  the  effective realisation of  young people’s  potential  “without
outright or concealed forms of ethnic discrimination.” 
5.6. Identities and Europe
“Ethnic” and “cultural-religious” differences are not publicly demonstrated and, as stated,
are of no importance when members of the majority and minority work together on pre-accession
programs.  There  are,  however,  some  differences  in  “self-awareness”  and  “declaration”  of
identity. When asked to grade their identities according to importance, Bulgarians usually place
the national and civil identity at the top, followed by regional (“Rhodopian”) or local identity,
and in the end, they also mention, with or without reservation, their European identity. Turks and
Bulgarian Muslims seem to put stress on the regional and civil identity. (In fact, Turks prioritise
their ethnic (Turkish) identity, while Muslim Bulgarians their religious (Muslim) identity.)
The question if and how much they view themselves as “Europeans”, triggered a dual
reaction. At first,  there was a sense of offence, as the question was understood as excluding
Bulgaria  from  the  European  historic  and  cultural  community.  The  division  Europe/Asia
represents an important element of the national identity, especially in the regions with Turkish
populations. There is no equation between “Europe” and “European Union.”
“Europe”  is  inseparably  linked  with  norms,  laws,  freedom  of  choice  and  better
possibilities for professional development. The qualities described as “European” are tolerance,
responsibility, order, and higher quality of work.
For most of the respondents (from all groups), acquiring the “European identity” and “a
sense that they are a part of Europe” was equal to “obtaining a European self-awareness.” This
self-awareness has both symbolic and had real dimensions, such as a higher standard of living,
freedom of choice and better personal and professional development.
The  role  of  the  EU  in  this  process  is  evaluated  in  two  ways.  For  some,  more
pessimistically, changes for better can only come from outside the country, by being “forced”
upon Bulgarians after EU accession. Others note that “the EU will not raise their salaries” and
therefore “we should go towards Europe, and not wait for Europe to come to us.”
Pre-accession programs are seen as a first step towards this positive development. As
noted, the programs have helped those involved in them to change their mentality for the better.
They are satisfied with their experience and the results they have achieved, and are proud that
their activities have contributed to the development of their city and region. The rest are more
sceptical.
On the other hand, the majority of respondents stated that even after EU membership,
local people “should try not to lose […] their culture and identity” (Respondent 9, Respondent
29, Respondent 38). This attitude is typical of the Muslim Bulgarians who hope to become a part
of a larger diversity and thus escape the humiliating ‘historical’  perception of their  religious
identity by the majority.
Generally  speaking,  the  field  research  outlined  two  patterns  of  attitude  towards  and
perceptions of EU integration: a “more optimistic” and a “more pessimistic” one. The optimistic
approach is found amongst politicians (both on local and central level), persons employed in
municipal and district administration, representatives of non-governmental and civil sector, and
among those individuals and entrepreneurs, who participated in projects. People (mainly from the
private sector), who were left outside of these processes – as stated above, not only for subjective
reasons – are more pessimistic.  They worry that EU accession will  not  only bring  positive
developments  (in  particular,  “European” rules  and  better  business  environment),  but  also  is
representative  of  a  danger:  the  higher  quality  and  lower  prices  of  products  the  Bulgarian
producers will not be able to compete with.
6. Concluding remarks: relationship between ethnic-national identity and territory
Two basic factors influence the changes in the two districts of Kardzhali and Smolyan,
which  are  inhabited  mainly by Turks  and  Bulgarian  Muslims,  namely:  the  liberalisation  of
minority rights and the restructuring of the local economy. These factors stimulate the political
and cultural mobilisation of the two Muslim minorities, change their economic status, and create
new foundations for their attitude towards the state and the Bulgarian national majority. It should
be noted that  the changes that  occurred after 1989 have been viewed as  part  of  the  overall
Europeanisation of the country, and as such they have been welcomed and positively accepted by
the representatives of the minorities. The penetration of the pre-accession funds in the region has
been perceived in the same context: as part of the new political situation, and yet, it is probably
too early to assess their overall impact.
The  changes in  the  two minority districts,  subject  to  the  research, which  outline  the
specific “Bulgarian” characteristics of the project, are the following:
1) Since 1989 both Muslim communities, Turks and Bulgarian Muslims, have displayed
strong political mobilisation.
For the Turks this mobilisation is related to MRF, to which they have delegated almost
unlimited rights (more than 60% of the Turks vote for MRF on parliamentary and local elections)
to  represent them on all  levels  of  the legislative (the Parliament  and the local  councils) and
executive power (the central government and the mayor institution). One of the reasons for the
Turks to recognise MRF as “their own” party is the fact that it was established and is now led by
community leaders who have opposed the policy of forced assimilation of the socialist state.
Very important  also is  the fact that  MRF demonstrates real concerns for the socio-economic
situation in the border minority regions and has always held the opinion that these regions must
be assisted by the state at least until they find an appropriate alternative for the local economy
(mainly tobacco growing). Another factor is that, regardless of the criticism against MRF for
being “ethnically based”, coming from both right and left parties, MRF has always conducted
realistic and moderate policies of minority right protection in compliance with the Bulgarian and
International  Law.  The  MRF’s  political  platform  is  built  upon  the  principles  of  territorial
integrity and sovereignty of the Bulgarian state, and therefore MRF has a significant contribution
to the development of the model of peaceful ethnic tension elimination. The latter attracts the
members of the Turkish minority without aspirations for territorial separation, especially on the
eve of Bulgaria’s accession to the EU, because they are satisfied not only by the degree of their
participation in the government,  but also by their civil  freedoms and the possibility to freely
maintain contacts with their “motherland”.
The political mobilisation of the Bulgarian Muslim minority manifests itself in different
ways. At first glance the failure of the attempts for the formation of a  “Pomak” party (discussed
in  the State of  the Art  Report),  and the absence of absolute confidence in MRF among the
Muslims  in  the  Smolyan  District,  whose  political  behaviour  follows  the  general  Bulgarian
electoral model, are a result of the “absence of internal group cohesion”, as frequently reported
by the researchers . The reality is not exactly the same. The refusal of the Bulgarian Muslims to
recognize MRF as their own party is a result of the reputation of MRF being a “Turkish” party,
while the differentiation between the two Muslim groups on ethnic grounds was the basic process
determining their relations in 20th century, and this differentiation was enhanced deliberately by
the policy of the  Bulgarian state.  As some of  the respondents imply in their interviews, the
Muslim Bulgarians,  living in  the  Middle  Rhodopes,  would  not  wish  to  be  criticised by the
majority for being “Turkicised” by MRF. Therefore, since the beginning of the transition, the
Bulgarian  Muslims  have  supported  the  natural  defender  of  their  rights  –  the  Union  of  the
Democratic  Forces. In spite  of the economic collapse of the  region, caused by the intensive
privatisation carried out by the second UDF Government, the Muslim Bulgarians continue to
support parties on the right of the political spectrum, relying not so much on the party programs,
but  on local  individuals  whom they know well  and in  whom they believe.  As  the  Turks  in
Kardzhali  District  do,  the  Bulgarian  Muslims  also  exercise  total  control  over  their  local
authorities, regardless of the fact that their representatives belong to different parties.    
2) Notwithstanding the lack of concrete data on the effect of the pre-accession funds, it
can be concluded, that in Kardzhali and Smolyan Districts they have led to the creation of a new
administrative capacity, prepared to plan and manage the local economic policy; the negative
consequences of the closing of the unprofitable socialist enterprises (mainly in the mining and
processing industries) have been mitigated to some extent through the creation of new, although
insufficient  in  number,  employment  opportunities;  the  local  businessmen  and  agricultural
producers  are  encouraged  to  introduce  new  technical  equipment  and  new  production
technologies, in order to adapt themselves to the competitive economic environment, which they
will enter after accession to the EU.
3) The representatives of both minorities, Turkish and Muslim Bulgarians, think that their
minority rights are guaranteed by the Bulgarian legislation and are respected, despite the fact
that  some  disturbing  phenomena  are  noticed.  Besides,  they  are  convinced  that  there  are
supranational (European) power structures, which are not indifferent to the economic welfare of
the minority regions and which could guarantee that their rights would be respected in the future
as well.
4) On the other hand, as far as conclusions could be drawn from the attitude of the Turks
to the study of their mother tongue, the  linguistic  mobilisation of the community is  of less
significance than the political one. At the same time the Turks,  and especially the Bulgarian
Muslims,  insist  on  the  teaching  of  religion:  religious  education is  considered  extremely
important for the spiritual development of the young people – at least in religious families, – and
for  Muslim  Bulgarians  it  plays  an  important  role  in  contributing  to  the  cohesion  of  the
community and the formation of community’s identity.
5) The overall impression is that all respondents representing the political and cultural
elites, and the business circles, relate their future to their region and its economic and cultural
prosperity. The relations among representatives of the majority and the minorities, engaged
with  the  issues  of  regional  development  and  European  integration,  are  characterised  by  a
dominating spirit of cooperation.
The respondents – both from the majority and from the minorities – have not openly
displayed their  ethnic, religious, and  even  party affiliation. This fact proves  per se that the
ethnic  and  religious  differences  are  still  important  enough  to  be  silently  omitted,  although
mutual tolerance is always emphasised.
When  asked  how  they  visualise  Europe and  how  they  see  their  place  in  it,  all
respondents from the majority and from the minorities are unanimous on two issues: Bulgaria has
always been part of the European historical and cultural space, and its citizens are Europeans.
Yet, they confess that they do not feel to be ‘real Europeans’ as something is lacking (the most
frequently mentioned factors are the different – ‘Oriental’ – attitudes towards labour and the low
incomes). There is also unanimity that upon entering Europe, all  communities must preserve
their specific (national, ethnic, cultural, etc. characteristics.)
Finally, to summarise the results of the research with regard to the expected four “ideal
forms” of (re)configuration of minority-majority interests and identities in subnational regions,
which are distinguished by their  relationship  to the  central  state  and the way they view the
connection between the cultural, political and territorial unit and variable conceptions of the EU,
then the Bulgarian model  will definitely not belong to the first two types (national-state and
national-civic forms). The members of the local elites tend to present the situation in the region
within the framework of the third type (regional-civic form), which probably corresponds to their
idea of the “ideal” model they wish to achieve. It is  characterised by:  extensive  regional co-
operation,  support  for decentralisation,  as well  as increasingly institutionalised  regional-local
alliances  across political  parties  and  across national-ethnic  communities;  local-subnational
government increasingly operating as a representative of the region rather than of the ethnic or
national community; minority-majority interests and politics  defined by growing convergence
around  economic  and  regional  development  objectives;  declining  politicisation  of  cultural
identity issues and their re-orientation away and dissociation from the state; identification with
Europe is  widespread and the  EU is  seen  as  an entity where various  cultural  identities  can
flourish but is seen primarily as a source of more efficient government, economic competence
and regional  competitiveness.  At  the  same time,  especially in  Kardzhali  District,  where the
Bulgarian national majority is actually a local minority and MRF has strong positions in the local
government,  some characteristics of the fourth type (regional-ethnic form) can be detected: a
dominant minority in the region or in areas within the region, which has established or seeks to
establish control over local government and economic resources; local government operating as
representative of the ethnic community rather than of the local population. On the other hand,
some important characteristics are absent: the interests of the minority are definitely not aligned
with  a  national  state  centre  outside  Bulgaria;  the  minority  does  not  express  aspirations  for
regional political autonomy, and while speaking about that issue, MRF opposes not only any
separatist claims, but also any demands for collective minority rights, now and then raised by
other Turkish nationalist organisations without serious support among the Turkish population.
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